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This report examines the factors involved in determining the fire safety in tall 
buildings following an earthquake, and assesses the risk to occupants in such an event 
for a building designed to the Acceptable Solutions of the New Zealand Building 
Code.  
 
The development of performance based design requirements for fire is reviewed, with 
particular reference to the New Zealand Building Code. The usual philosophy of such 
building codes is that they should consider all potential events that could lead to an 
unsatisfactory level of risk. The Acceptable Solutions of the New Zealand Code 
provide non-mandatory prescriptive design options for compliance. The section on 
fire safety does not specifically consider the impact of post- earthquake fire in the 
determining fire safety provisions. Of particular concern is the high probability of 
failure of active and passive fire safety systems observed in earthquake events 
throughout the world.  
 
The Acceptable Solution is also widely used as a base document for setting the safety 
level for alternative designs. Unfortunately it contains many provisions that lack the 
consistency, transparency and technical validation to give practitioners confidence 
that its use will guarantee satisfactory performance. 
 
In this report, a case study building designed to the Acceptable Solution is assessed 
for life safety following an earthquake, and the probability of loss of life in event of a 
fire is found to be significant.  Failures of the sprinkler system and the passive 
protection to the stairs are identified as the principal contributors to the unsatisfactory 
performance, and recommendations are made for improving their reliability. 
 
Recommendations are made to improve the post-earthquake reliability of fire safety 
systems and to amend the New Zealand Building Code Acceptable Solution to include 
the consideration of earthquake vulnerability of systems and utilities. 
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The objective of this report is to identify key factors affecting the fire safety of tall 
buildings after an earthquake, with particular reference to the requirements of the New 




Major earthquakes in urban areas have often been followed by significant 
conflagrations that have been difficult to control and have resulted in extensive 
damage to property. Major contributing factors have been identified as accidental 
ignition due to earthquake shaking, external fire spread through vegetation and 
inadequate building separation, earthquake damage to building’s fire safety systems, 
loss of water supplies for fire suppression, and the lack of intervention by fire fighters 
due inadequate resources and obstructed access to the site of the fires. 
 
Similarly, occupants within buildings may be subject to increased risk of loss of life 
due to potential damage or failure of the building’s active and passive fire safety 
features, possible obstruction of exitways due to damage to the building’s fixtures and 
fittings, and reduced likelihood of external intervention. Tall buildings can be 
considered as especially vulnerable due to increased escape path lengths, limited 
escape options, high occupancy loads, a high level of reliance on active fire control 
systems and communication systems, and often a dependency on external intervention 
to facilitate fire suppression and/or escape of occupants. Of particular concern is the 
uncontrolled fire growth that can occur when sprinkler systems become inoperative 
due to system damage or lack of water. 
 
Trade-off provisions allowing reductions in passive fire systems where sprinklers are 
installed have been increasingly incorporated in prescriptive codes since the 1970s. 
There is little doubt that sprinklers are the most effective form of fire protection 
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available. However there is a danger that an unacceptable reliance may be placed on 
these seismically vulnerable systems, which could leave the building occupants with 
little protection from fire after a significant earthquake. 
 
Performance based building codes give designers the flexibility to use increasingly 
sophisticated active fire safety systems, and to properly assess the risk associated with 
reductions in the passive fire separations.  The probability of occurrence of fire after 
earthquake will be low, but for a tall building in particular the consequence may be 
disastrous. It is obvious therefore that fire after earthquake is a design scenario that 
should be properly addressed in any performance based design in locations where 




The project consists of a literature review, a review of current design practice and a 
risk assessment. 
 
The literature review covers previous work on post earthquake fire design. It also 
considers summarised case studies of previous earthquake events, which are used to 
identify the vulnerability of active and passive fire safety systems, the probability of 
ignition and fire growth, and the reliability of external intervention.  
 
A review is given of current New Zealand Building Code provisions for fire, 
including a summary of the requirements of the prescriptive Acceptable Solution for 
active and passive systems required for tall buildings. 
 
A risk assessment is carried out on a typical office building designed to the 
Acceptable Solution to the New Zealand Building Code. Although the New Zealand 
Building Code is a performance document, the Acceptable Solution is a non-
mandatory, prescriptive means of meeting the code performance requirements, and 
includes significant trade-off reductions in passive fire separations due to active 
systems installed in the building.   The risk assessment endeavours to measure the 





The outputs from the project consist of recommendations on building code provisions 
for the design of tall buildings to ensure an acceptable level of risk from a post-
earthquake fire. Areas where further research is needed are also identified. 
 
 1.5 Sprinkler reliability 
 
Some commentators have assessed the reliability of sprinkler systems in normal 
service as less than 90%, although New Zealand statistics are generally much better 
than this. The system reliability is likely to be much reduced after an earthquake.  
When trade-offs have been used to reduce the rating of the passive fire separations, 
the level of performance of these elements will be critical to maintain life safety. The 
conclusions of this report will be of assistance in assessing the implications of 
sprinkler reliability.  
 
1.6 Other extreme events 
 
While this report is limited to fire following an earthquake, it is suggested that many 
of the underlying principles and findings may be relevant to other low probability 
extreme events. Recent high profile disasters have highlighted the possibility of an 
increasing occurrence of malicious intervention, resulting in fire events well outside 
the normal design fire scenarios. Examples would be the vulnerability of active fire 
systems to sabotage and vandalism, and the possibility of extraordinary levels of fire 
load due to terrorism or the use of explosives or accelerants. Clearly the dependence 
on a single means of protection designed for a “typical “ fire event may no longer be 
appropriate considering the potentially extreme consequences of such events.  
 
1.7 Outline of report. 
 
The remainder of this report comprises the following sections. 
2.  Review of non-earthquake fire design issues for tall buildings. 
3. Review of the effect of earthquake on building fire safety 
4. Literature review of fire after earthquake 
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5. Discussion on performance codes for general (non-earthquake related) 
fire design 
6. Review of New Zealand regulatory requirements, with emphasis on 
fire and earthquake. 
7. A review of the prescriptive New Zealand Acceptable Solution for fire 
design. 
8. Assessment of the reliability of critical fire safety systems, in both 
normal and post-earthquake situations. 
9. A risk assessment of post-earthquake fire on a tall office building 
designed to the Acceptable Solutions. 








The level of fire safety in a building is the result of a complex interaction of many 
factors including the ignition, fire growth, spread of smoke and fire, the active and 
passive fire protection features in the building, the behaviour of the building 
occupants, and the response of the fire service. The level of safety needs to be 
addressed for a particular use, which will determine the fire load potential of the 
building contents and the number, ages and physical and mental ability of the building 
occupants. 
 
Some types of building may, by nature of their location, construction, layout or use, 
present special considerations not found in more conventional buildings. Tall 
buildings are one such category. 
 
Tall buildings are defined, for the purpose of this report, as buildings with an escape 
height of 25 metres or more. This is the height at which sprinkler protection becomes 
mandatory for all uses under the New Zealand Building Code Acceptable Solution 
C/AS1 (BIA, 2000). This is close to the 75 feet ( 22.5 metres) height that defines a 
High-Rise Building in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code®  (NFPA 2000). 
 
2.2 Fire development and growth. 
 
Fire development and growth is primarily a function of the fire load and 
characteristics of the building contents, and the construction, dimensions and 
ventilation of the spaces within the building. Fire and smoke spread beyond the room 
of fire origin is determined by the developed size of the fire, the fire resistance and 






2.3 Performance requirements 
 
Performance requirements for fire safety in the New Zealand Building Code are to 
provide adequate means of escape, to facilitate fire-fighting operations, and to protect 
adjacent buildings from the effects of fire. Generally the prevention of fire spread 
within a building is only required between household (i.e. sleeping) units and to 
protect means of escape. 
 
2.4 Fire design philosophy. 
 
The general features of a fire design philosophy should include measures to: 
• control ignition 
• control fire growth 
• control internal fire and smoke spread to allow time for escape 
• control external fire spread for duration of the fire 
• provide adequate means of escape 
• facilitate fire service operations 
• prevent structural collapse for complete burnout of the fire. 
 
These will generally be achieved by a combination of systems as appropriate to each 
building, which may include: 
Management systems to; 
• limit fire load and accidental ignition  
• ensure that all fire safety features are properly managed and 
maintained  
• provide for and facilitate safe  and speedy evacuation  
Passive fire protection systems, including internal compartmentation, external 
wall construction and structural fire protection to; 
• limit fire and smoke spread within the building,  
• limit fire spread beyond the building  
• maintain structural integrity. 
• provide adequate, appropriately located, protected means of escape. 
• facilitate fire fighting operations. 
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Active fire protection systems to: 
• control fire growth and spread (sprinklers). 
• control smoke spread  (smoke control, pressurisation). 
• give adequate warning of fire . 
Fire service intervention to: 
• Assist escape. 
• Protect other property. 
 
Table 2.1 shows how a fire may develop progressively if not controlled. It indicates 
appropriate systems that, if installed, may prevent or increase the time required for the 
fire to progress to the next stage. The table is adapted for a similar table in Sekizawa 
et al. (2000).  
 
2.5 Tall buildings. 
 
Statistics suggest that tall buildings have a low risk of fire per square metre of floor 
area (Hall, 1997). However the small numbers of tall building fires that do occur often 
have significant social impact on the local economy and emergency services. 
 
There are a number of special features that make tall buildings worthy of special 
consideration. Caldwell (1997) identified the following particular risks. 
• Restrictions on effective fire service intervention. This includes inability of 
fire fighters to effectively carry out fire fighting or rescue operations from 
outside the building, and delays reaching the seat of the fire from inside the 
building.  This latter is due to the inaccessibility of the upper floors and the 
logistics of deploying sufficient personnel and equipment to carry out an 
adequate rescue or fire fighting operation. 
• Delays in escape due to limited number of escape routes, queuing at stairways, 
and extended escape routes lengths from upper floors.  
• The effect of natural phenomena on fire and smoke movement. This includes 
wind forces as well as the potentially significant “stack” effect, which can 
cause large air movements due to convective currents.  
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• Possible high concentration of fuel and occupant loads compared with low-rise 
buildings, which leads to potentially larger fires and more persons at risk.  
• Mixed tenancies and uses with different configurations, which may require 
complex, interactive fire safety systems 
• Sophisticated building services often serving many floors. These may require 
shared service shafts and ducting that require careful treatment to protect the 
services from fire damage and to prevent fire or smoke migrating between 
firecells. 
 
These issues require different and additional design considerations, which may 
include complex integrated systems, to achieve an equivalent level of fire safety to 
that of low-rise buildings. However the incorporation of sophisticated fire safety 
features does not guarantee safety.  Zicherman (1992) reported on a number of 
specific concerns identified from case studies. These include: 
• Earthquake damage to sprinkler systems in the Loma Prieta Earthquake caused 
significant water damage. If fire had occurred following the earthquake, the 
damaged sprinkler system and the reduced passive fire protection due to trade-
offs may have caused loss of the building. 
• Compartmentation is important to control fire spread. Tall buildings are at 
much greater risk from post-flashover fires than low-rise buildings. Isolation 
of the area of fire origin significantly improves the chances of safe evacuation 
and successful fire service intervention. 
• Exterior façade design must consider the potential for vertical fire spread 
between floors as occurred in the First Interstate Bank fire in Los Angeles 
(Morris, 1990). 
• Smoke spread, exacerbated by the stack effect, may occur through 
inadequately sealed service ducts. In the Las Vegas MGM fire (Best and 
Demers, 1982) this caused fatalities due to smoke inhalation many floors 
above the floor of fire origin. 
• Management systems also become relatively more important, as human 
response to fire cues is more critical in tall buildings. The margins of safety 
are generally less, and occupants are therefore at greater risk if evacuation 
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procedures are inadequate. Good emergency planning is critical in ensuring 
effective, rapid escape. 
 
One aspect of tall building fire safety that is undergoing further development in the 
US is the use of elevators for evacuation. Jennings (2000) reports that current elevator 
recall systems continue to fail, putting fire fighters at risk. This has led to a shift from 
pressurisation of stairwells to pressurisation of elevator shafts and lobbies, and refuge 
areas. This has potential to allow full use of elevators during evacuation, including 
provision for persons with disabilities. However appropriate management systems, 
communication and training will continue to be a crucial element for successful 
implementation of elevator evacuation. 
 
2.6 System reliability and redundancy. 
 
The principal aim of the fire safety systems in tall buildings must be to control fire 
and smoke spread to allow sufficient time for safe evacuation of the building and to 
facilitate fire fighting operations. It is generally accepted that the installation of 
sprinklers coupled with adequate compartmentation is the most effective way to limit 
fire growth and minimise property damage. Prescriptive code options in New Zealand 
and the USA require sprinklers for tall buildings. However the introduction of 
performance codes allows designers to select other options provided the performance 
requirements can be met. If sprinklers are not installed, a higher level of performance 
is demanded from the passive fire separations to prevent the fully developed fire 
spreading to other floors and to protect egress routes.  
 
The presence of sprinklers does not guarantee fire safety in all situations. All systems 
have a finite probability of failure. In addition many sophisticated safety systems have 
an effectiveness and reliability that is difficult to assess in a real fire situation. The 
design of pressurisation systems for instance is very dependent on design assumptions 
and the integrity of the associated passive enclosures.  And passive fire separations 
are known to be vulnerable to often unauthorised service penetrations, and ineffective 
door closers. And all systems, active and passive, will only perform to expectation if 
they are regularly inspected and maintained. 
 
 11 
It is also seen as appropriate to make some allowance for unforseen events. This could 
include fires in unexpected locations. For instance Hall (1997) noted that some 10.6% 
of reported fire in tall apartment buildings in the US between 1985 and 1995 occurred 
in egress routes.  Other potentially disastrous scenarios could include unexpectedly 
large fire loads, arson, and system damage due to vandalism or earthquake. 
 
In view of the complexity in assessing the worst likely effect of fire in a tall building, 
and the high risk of loss of life if the systems fail, it is recommended that design 
systems should incorporate a degree of conservatism. This should be by way of 
redundancy, diversity and independence of the fire safety systems, as discussed 
further in Section 5.6 of this report. Most current prescriptive codes for tall buildings 
will include a wide range of active and passive systems. The New Zealand Code 
Acceptable Solutions are typical in this respect, with the range of required systems 
increasing with the building height (Refer Section 7.4 of this report). This is 
consistent with the philosophy noted above of providing a high level of redundancy 
and independence of protection systems to allow for finite system reliability, design 













History has demonstrated that large earthquakes can have a devastating effect on the 
built environment. As well as damage to buildings and their contents, effects may 
include uncontrolled urban fire spread, and disruption to communications, transport 
and services such as water supply and electric power. This can result in a number of 
potential impacts on building fire safety. These effects are examined in terms of the 
critical factors that determine the extent of damage, current building code 
requirements, and observations and statistical analysis based on recent earthquakes.   
 
3.2 Potential effects on building fire safety 
 
There are a number of potential effects of earthquake on tall buildings that need to be 
considered to fully address the earthquakes impact of fire safety. These include;  
• Accidental ignition, possibly in more than one location, due to damage to gas 
or electrical services or appliances. 
• Fire and smoke spread due to damaged passive protection and building 
services, non-operation of suppression and control systems, and lack of water 
supply for fire fighting. 
• Delayed evacuation due to damage and obstruction in escape routes, loss of 
lighting, and inoperative alarm systems 
• Lack of fire service intervention to control fire spread and facilitate escape.  
 
3.3 Principal variables determining damage 
 
In any particular case, the principal variables that determine the extent of damage to 
the fire safety systems are as follows; 
 
• Earthquake intensity. This is a measure of the ground shaking at the site. The 
measurement scale used in New Zealand is the Modified Mercalli (MM) 
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Intensity Scale, which is a subjective assessment of the likely effects on 
people, fittings, structures and the environment. The currently used version of 
the scale was adopted in 1992 (Study Group of NZNSEE, 1992), and a 
suggested revised version to include modern ductile buildings (Dowrick, 
1996) is reproduced in Appendix A of this report. Earthquake damage to 
modern buildings may be expected to occur from intensity MM6.  
• Subsoil Properties. The dynamic properties of the subsoil can have a 
significant influence on the response of a building to an earthquake. For 
instance stiff buildings on strong subsoils and flexible buildings on weak 
subsoils may both exhibit a greater response than for an intermediate soil type. 
In addition some soils have potential for liquefaction (loss of soil strength due 
to pore water pressure), which can result in foundation failure.  
• Ground conditions will also have an effect on the seismic reliability of buried 
services (water, gas, oil etc.), which may fail due to ground dislocation in a 
significant event. 
• Building Type. The configuration and structural characteristics of a building 
will have a significant effect on it dynamic properties. Stiff shear wall type 
buildings and more flexible frame buildings will respond very differently to 
any particular earthquake. Flexible buildings will be subject to greater 
deflections, and non-structural elements such as wall and glazing will be at 
risk unless they are separated from the structure. Stiff buildings will be subject 
to greater accelerations and may result in larger loads on equipment, fixtures 
and fittings and their fixings.  
• Building Age. The understanding of earthquakes and building response has 
developed significantly over the last few decades. Building codes 
requirements have shown an important change of emphasis from designing for 
a minimal level of lateral load strength to detailing to achieve robust energy 
absorbing elements for ductile post-elastic deformations. In New Zealand, 
requirements to consider earthquakes in design first appeared in 1935, and it 
was not until 1976 that proper consideration of ductility was incorporated.  It 
is therefore likely that many pre-1976 buildings will perform well below the 
level expected from current design methods.  
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3.4 Structural damage 
 
For modern buildings, significant structural damage should occur only at high 
earthquake intensity levels. Dowrick (1996) suggests that some buildings may exhibit 
structural damage from MM9. Most modern buildings should not collapse in a MM12 
event, although heavy damage would generally be expected. However lesser levels of 
structural damage may have implications on fire safety. Significant cracking or 
movement may allow smoke penetration through walls and slabs, and dislodge fire 
resistant coatings from structural elements.  Damage to stairs may hinder evacuation 
from the building. 
  
3.5 Non- structural damage 
 
Brunsdon and Clark (2000) suggest that current New Zealand design requirements for 
ductile frame structures offer only limited protection to building parts and contents, 
even in a moderate earthquake. Fragile elements and unsecured contents may exhibit 
damage as low as intensity MM7. 
 
Walls, partitions and external glazing are vulnerable to damage in a moderate 
earthquake due to the loads applied as the building deflects. Fire separations may 
suffer significant cracking and loose their fire integrity. The loss of exterior glazing 
will change the ventilation factors for a fire compartment and may allow development 
of larger fires than anticipated in the design.  
 
Fire stopping in seismic joints and services penetrations may be dislodged and 
become ineffective.  
 
Services ducts may be broken or dislocated allowing passage of smoke.  
 
Dislocation of fixtures and fittings such as ceiling systems and shelving are well 
documented, and can cause injury and delay evacuation. Toppling and sudden 




3.6 Active systems damage. 
 
Equipment without back-up power will be vulnerable to failure of the urban supply. 
 
Detectors, circuits and panels on alarm and control systems may become damaged or 
dislodged by impact if not adequately secured. 
 
Sprinkler systems are subject to damage from inertia loads on the suspended 
pipework, movement across seismic joints, and impact with suspended ceilings. 
Reserve water supply tanks are vulnerable if not adequately secured. 
 
Smoke detectors are vulnerable to dust dislodged during earthquake motion and may 
become unreliable. 
 
Mechanical systems such as smoke control and pressurisation may become ineffective 
due to dislocation of ductwork and equipment or loss of electric power. 
 
3.7 Lifelines system damage. 
 
In-ground reticulated services may be damaged by ground movement or dislocation, 
or by the failure of the supply system pumps, reservoirs etc.  
 
Electric power supplies may fail due to damage to cabling, reticulation system or 
equipment. Network communication systems may face similar problems.  
 
Transport systems may be significantly disrupted due to ground movement, resulting 
in damage to roading, airport runways, embankments and reclaimed land and rail 
tracks, structural failure to bridges, terminals and control buildings, and loss of 
communication systems. 
 
These factors will have a major effect on the ability of rescue, fire fighting and 




 3.8 Earthquake loss prediction. 
 
Prediction of damage caused by earthquakes has, until recently, concentrated on 
macro-scale considerations for use in insurance loss exposure and for planning 
mitigation of disruption to lifelines and utilities. The assessments are typically based 
on data from observed earthquakes, and any assessment of building systems is usually 
generic in nature. The data is analysed to identify different categories of building to 
enable meaningful loss prediction for specific communities. Examples of such 
projects include Rojahn and Sharpe (1985) and Thiel (1996) in the US, and Shephard 
et al. (2002) in New Zealand.  
 
While these investigations recognised the threat of fire in the post-earthquake 
environment, they generally considered only those earthquake effects that could 
contribute to potential urban conflagration, principally loss of water supply and 
unavailability of fire service intervention. Little attempt was made to predict damage 
to specific building elements and systems, and the impact of such damage on life 
safety. 
 
Following the 1994 Northridge earthquake in the US, the need for a more detailed 
examination of the performance of non-structural components was recognised, and a 
seminar was held to identify the principal issues and initiate further research and more 
detailed reporting procedures for reconnaissance teams. (Rojahn, 1998). 
 
The increasing availability of information on performance of individual elements has 
encouraged moves in the US and Japan to develop damage assessment methods for 
individual buildings based on the vulnerability of the particular elements and systems 
in the building. This is consistent with the move to performance evaluation for 
building design, allowing due consideration to be given to the individual 
characteristics of each building rather than being limited to global assessment 
categories. 
 
Porter and Scawthorn (1998) considered the post-earthquake reliability of critical 
equipment systems in the San Francisco Bay Area. Their paper included a 
comparative analysis of risk of loss of life and property damage in a typical high-rise 
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building with unbraced and retrofitted sprinkler systems. A cost/benefit analysis of the 
retrofit was included. 
 
Porter et al. (2001) have also developed a wider performance evaluation model that 
considers both active and passive systems. This incorporates the results of 
considerable testing to predict the fragility of wood framed partitions and glazing to 
imposed deformations. The method does not directly consider post-earthquake fire 
safety, but the vulnerability of sprinkler systems, switch gear and generators are all 
included for individual consideration. The method provides a probabilistic 
determination of direct repair costs and loss-of-use costs as well as giving quantified 
damage level estimates for comparison with performance based design objectives.   
 
Sekizawa et al. (2000) are developing a similar method that extends to prediction of 
post-earthquake fire spread in the building. The procedure is principally based on 
analysis of observed damage, ignition and fire spread fire in recent earthquakes in 
Japan. It includes a simplified model of structural response to predict the earthquake 
actions on individual building element. 
 
3.9 Damage levels. 
 
The general extent of damage in more recent earthquakes has been well documented, 
and an extensive summary prepared by Botting (1998) details the fire safety 
implications of these reports. They generally show a wide variation in the extent of 
damage observed for any particular earthquake event.  In the absence of information 
about the seismic characteristics of the individual building or the seismic design of the 
building elements it is difficult to use the data to make any useful prediction of system 
damage for specific buildings.  
 
Case studies of past earthquakes have however been a catalyst for more extensive 
testing and modelling of non-structural building elements to enable better damage 
prediction, and proper performance assessment to meet building code requirements.  
This has included work by Porter et al. (2001) on drywall construction, glazing and 




A particular concern with the performance of non-structural elements is coordination 
of the design and detailing to achieve the required performance. Often the systems are 
designed and installed by contractors who have neither the ability nor the contractual 
responsibility to review the seismic performance of the systems they are installing. 
Beattie (2000) highlighted this concern following a number of audits of building 
services. Feeney (2001) raises the same concerns in relation to passive fire protection 
to structural elements. 
 
3.10 Review of principal fire safety elements 
 
This review provides general comment on the relative vulnerability of specific 
elements with particular reference to buildings designed to current earthquake codes. 
 
a. Sprinkler systems.  
Sprinkler systems have proved to be vulnerable in many past 
earthquakes. Principal damage scenarios are lack of restraint to the 
system pipework and damage to heads due to impact with ceilings 
(Gates amd McGavin, 1998). Current codes should require a high level 
of earthquake security due to the life safety issues involved. However 
both Fleming  (1998) and Beattie  (2000 and 2001) found that current 
provisions were inadequate.  
 
b.       Water supply. 
Water supply is again a crucial element in post- earthquake fire safety, 
both for sprinkler protection and to allow intervention by building 
occupants and fire fighters. Loss of supply has been a significant 
element in the post-fire conflagrations in a number of earthquakes. 
Todd et al. (1994) recorded failure of the water supply due to 
widespread damage in the 1994 Northridge earthquake. However the 
risk of fire development in an individual building can be significantly 
reduced if a robust reserve water supply is provided to supplement the 
urban reticulation. (Harmsworth,  2001). 
 
 20 
The vulnerability of the reticulated water supply is outside the control 
of the building owner, and is dictated largely by the ground conditions 
and the age and condition of the system. It is also evident that a 
temporary failure in supply or even a moderate reduction in mains 
pressure can have critical implication for a tall building. In addition the 
supply is likely to be unreliable for a number of weeks as the mains are 
repaired and reactivated. (Brunsdon and Clark, 2000)  
 
Where supply tanks and pumping equipment are provided within 
buildings it is important that these are adequately restrained. Pipework 
must also be designed and detailed for earthquake actions, and 
provision must be made to allow for anticipated movement at seismic 
joints.  
 
c. Non- structural fire separations 
 
Damage to non-structural partitions is a function of the racking loads 
imposed by the deflections of the building. Damage is therefore more 
likely in flexible framed buildings, unless the partitions are separated 
from the structure to allow differential movement, and may occur in 
moderate earthquakes situations (Brunsdon and Clark, 2000). Smoke 
transmission can be expected once cracking of the lining material 
occurs, and fire spread becomes possible when the linings separate 
from the framing.  
 
Glazing in partitions is vulnerable values unless separations are 
provided between the glass and the surrounding structure. 
 
The fire integrity of partitions may also be compromised by impact of 
dislodged fittings and equipment. 
 
Any separation or movement joints that are required to maintain fire 
integrity must be detailed to allow the full anticipated seismic 
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movement. This movement can be considerable, particularly for 
seismic joints between tall buildings (James and Buchanan, 2000). 
 
d. Automatic alarm systems. 
 
Automatic alarm systems have be found to be vulnerable in an 
earthquake, in particular from secondary effect such as activation due 
to dust, short circuits following ceiling collapse, and water damage 
from failed pipework or sprinkler systems. Control equipment and 
cabling may be damaged if not adequately restrained, or by impact 
from falling fittings or equipment. 
 
Botting and Buchanan (2000) found little reported damage to the alarm 
or detection systems in the buildings assessed in their report. However 
even undamaged systems were often rendered ineffective in 
communicating with the fire service due to significant problems with 
radio and telephone links. 
 
a. Building services. 
 
Papers by Beattie (2000and 2001) and Shelton et al.(2002) have 
highlighted current concerns about the adequacy of design and 
detailing guidance for building services. In particular the prescriptive 
code requirements for restraint of major items of plant including 
generators, pumps, boilers, heat exchangers do not appear to match the 
probable earthquake response. Similarly pipework and ducting systems 
are often not adequately restrained, and are prone to damage due to 








The principal concerns are: 
• The potential for smoke and/or fire spread through damaged 
ducting, services shafts and penetrations. In addition dampers 
may fail to operate due to damage or detector malfunction. 
• The failure of mechanical services such as smoke control and 
safe path pressurisation. This may be due to power failure, 
detector activation malfunction or system damage. 
 
3.11 Post-earthquake ignition potential.  
 
Post earthquake ignition sources identified from past earthquakes are reviewed by 
Botting(1998). Scawthorn (1992) discusses ignition sources and predicts post 
earthquake ignition rates for typical high rise buildings for different earthquake 
intensities. 
 
Immediately following the earthquake event, the principal ignition sources are 
overturning of electrical appliances, short-circuiting of electrical equipment, gas 
leakage from damaged equipment and pipework and leakage of flammable fluids 
(including fuels for emergency generators etc.). Spillage of chemicals may also be a 
potential ignition source in buildings where they are utilised or stored. 
 
Another major concern is the high potential for ignition as electricity and gas supplies 
are restored some time after the earthquake. Leaking gas and damaged electrical 
appliances were identified as initiating a greater than normal incidence of fires in the 
days following the Kobe and Northridge earthquakes.  
 
Arson, vandalism, and use of candles and makeshift cooking appliances by 
unauthorised occupants have also been identified as potential ignition sources in the 







 3.12 Post-earthquake escape from buildings. 
 
Escape times from a post-earthquake fire may be adversely affected in a number of 
ways by earthquake damage, depending on the intensity of the event and the 
vulnerability of systems in the particular building.  These effects may include; 
 
• Failure of fire detection systems to alert occupants 
• Loss of lighting. 
• Loss of visibility due to smoke invasion. 
• Obstruction of escape routes by falling ceilings, displaced fittings, damaged 
doors. 
• Structural damage to stairs.   
 
In addition the escape routes may be threatened by smoke and fire spread earlier than 
anticipated in design due to the failure of sprinkler systems, smoke control systems 
and passive protection. The end result may be a considerable reduction in the safety 
margin for escape due to a longer required time to evacuate the building and a shorter 
time before conditions become untenable. 
 
The use of elevators for evacuation in tall buildings has much potential, and is in 
attracting increasing attention particularly in the US. (Jennings, 2000). However the 
safe and effective use of elevators and the necessary associated smoke control systems 
is dependent on a continuing, robust power supply and an operational detector and 
communication system. 
 
Occupant behaviour is extremely unpredictable in an earthquake event, with the 
magnitude of the earthquake being the principal determining factor. Murakani and 
Durkin (1988) have reported on a number of studies in Japan and the US, and find that 
behaviour in low intensity events are similar to fire events, with typical activities 
including assisting and protecting others and waiting for instructions. However in 
high intensity events any immediate activity will be impossible, and panic may occur.  
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In Japan there is a high awareness of the potential for post-earthquake fire, due to 
previous events and extensive training. This is not the case in New Zealand, where the 
failure of fire alarm and communication systems may delay occupant awareness of a 
developing fire. Building occupants are generally advised not to attempt to leave the 
building during the earthquake due to the hazards from falling building elements and 
glass. However it is considered likely the occupants will endeavour to evacuate the 
building as soon as possible, thereby reducing the risk exposure to a post-earthquake 




Significant earthquakes in urban areas can result is a large number of ignitions. Where 
the local fire services have inadequate resources to control the fires in the early stages 
there is a risk of a major conflagration. (Sekizawa, 1997).  
 
In addition intervention can be significantly delayed or rendered ineffective by: 
• Damage to emergency facilities, plant and operations centres 
• Loss of communication with emergency services. 
• Limited vehicle access due to damage and obstruction of transport routes. 
• Failure of water supplies. 
 
It is therefore inappropriate to assume any external assistance from trained personnel 
to assist with evacuation or fire fighting is any particular building. This will be 
particularly important where building evacuation planning includes “defend in place” 




Current building code provisions do not appear to make adequate provision for the 
seismic design of life safety systems. In addition the individual systems are often 
designed by subcontractors without the technical ability to properly assess the 
required earthquake response of the system. 
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Sprinkler protection is without a doubt the most effective method of controlling fire in 
tall buildings. Unfortunately sprinkler systems have been shown to be vulnerable in 
past earthquakes, due to both system damage and water supply failure.  
 
Smoke control and pressurisation are usually dependent on the external power supply. 
It is inappropriate to rely on their operation after a significant earthquake.  
  
It is therefore important that adequate passive systems be provided. These must be 
designed to accommodate earthquake effects without damage and to provide a fire 
and smoke separation that survives for sufficient time to allow safe evacuation of the 
building. 
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Botting (1998) reviewed the available literature on over 40 major earthquakes and 
carried out a comprehensive analysis of the impact of post-earthquake fire on the 
buildings and the urban environment. The paper contains a detailed description of 15 
selected events where significant fires occurred, and an extensive reference list. 
Botting and Buchanan (2000) contains a summary analysis of the findings including 
ignition sources, fire spread, damage to buildings, communication systems, fire 
protection systems and water supply, and impediment to fire service operations. 
Suggested mitigation measures are also included. 
 
Although many countries have in the past experienced the disaster of a post- 
earthquake fire, it is only in recent times that the issue has received significant 
attention. Even after the large urban fires following the 1906 San Francisco and 1923 
Tokyo earthquakes, Japan was the only country to immediately initiate research to 
address the problem. (Scawthorn, 1992). 
 
The initial focus of attention on post-earthquake fire was on fire spread in high-
density low-rise urban areas with little in-built fire resistance. This represented the 
major risk, to the predominant building stock at the time. However the literature and 
research on the topic has broadened and changed emphasis over time as a reflection of 
changes to the built environment and building performance philosophy. These 
include; 
• Increased use of sprinkler protection. 
• The increasing number of high rise buildings. 







4.2 Urban fire spread 
 
In 1986, Scawthorn (1986) reported that urban conflagration following earthquakes 
had caused the largest single losses due to earthquake in the United States and Japan. 
Urban fire spread was therefore one of the earliest topics addressed, with endeavours 
to find methodologies for estimating potential fire losses due to urban conflagrations. 
Moran (1958) identified the principal issues as; 
• Importance of emergency planning 
• Building design for fire protection 
• Communications  
• Post earthquake building inspections 
• Cut-out valves to gas supplies 
• Water supply vulnerability. 
 
Methodologies for measuring urban fire spread were being introduced in Japan from 
the 1960s and in the United States from 1980. Initially these were based on analysis of 
observed events, but later studies have become broader and more sophisticated, and 
based more on the principles of fire engineering. Recent papers, including one by 
Thomas et al. (2002) demonstrate the continuing work in this field, principally for 
lifelines planning and loss estimation. 
 
However the Wellington Lifelines Group (WLG, 2002) has noted that the models are 
very dependent on variable situational circumstances, such as wind speed and 
direction, and can only therefore give accurate fire spread predictions for specific 
limited scenarios. 
 
The same report identified a general lack of integrated response procedures by the fire 
service and utility organizations, which could result in inappropriate and inefficient 






4.3 Tall buildings 
 
The largest property losses due to post- earthquake fire are likely to continue to be due 
to conflagration in low or medium- rise buildings predominantly of timber 
construction, in high-density urban areas (WLG, 2002). However post-earthquake 
fires in tall buildings have the potential for unacceptable loss of life if adequate time is 
not available for evacuation. 
  
Scawthorn (1992) discussed specific issues related to tall buildings. These included; 
• Potential for multiple ignitions, from electrical, gas, fuel or chemical sources. 
• Fire spread due to damaged passive systems and glazing 
• Fire spread between buildings due to uncontrolled fire growth and lack of fire 
service intervention. 
• Damage to detection and suppression systems. 
 
Botting and Buchanan (2000) highlighted the need for proper coordination between 
the fire and seismic design, to ensure that all active and passive systems, all potential 
ignition sources and all escape routes are designed to have adequate seismic 
performance and restraint. 
 
4.4 Sprinkler system performance  
 
Seismic bracing became a requirement for sprinkler installations following the 1933 
Long Beach earthquake (Botting and Buchanan, 2000). Scawthorn et al (1988) 
reported that sprinkler bracing was generally effective, but only a small proportion of 
the building stock was sprinkler protected at that time.  However in 1992, Scawthorn 
(1992) noted the vulnerability of tall buildings in the event of a sprinkler system 
failure, and highlighted the observed low reliability of urban water supplies.  
 
Fleming (1998) reporting on the Northridge earthquake recorded the failure of some 
systems due to inadequate seismic bracing. He noted that the systems had been 
subject to earthquake accelerations far exceeding code requirements. Reporting on the 
same earthquake, Gates and McGavin (1998) observed that much damage to sprinkler 
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systems occurred due to differential movement where the sprinkler heads penetrated 
the suspended ceilings. Consequential water damage was significant.  
 
Although sprinkler installations have a high reliability, especially in Australia and 
New Zealand, (Marryatt, 1988), some commentators (Robertson (2001) and Botting 
and Buchanan (2000)) have expressed concerns at over-reliance on sprinkler systems, 
especially in association with trade-off reductions in passive protection. Barnes (1997) 
highlighted the futility of providing passive protection to compensate for a sprinkler 
system failure unless the protection had a sufficient fire resistance to contain the 
resulting uncontrolled fire.  
 
Harmsworth  (2001) discussed the vulnerability of municipal water supplies, and 
suggested that the provision of a small reserve water supply tank can significantly 
increase the reliability of the sprinkler system, without significant cost. 
 
The Wellington Lifelines Group (WLG, 2001) noted the historic reduction in 
requirements for fire separation between buildings, based on improved detection and 
suppression systems and fire service response. This suggests that more recent 
buildings may be more vulnerable to post-earthquake fire spread following sprinkler 
system damage. However this may be offset by the anticipated lower earthquake 
damage levels in these buildings. 
 
4.5 Performance codes. 
 
The general international trend towards performance codes has initiated a more 
rigorous examination of the risk assessment aspects of post-earthquake fire. 
Traditional prescriptive codes generally reflected historic events, and were considered 
to provide an adequate margin of safety to perform to an acceptable level in a low 
probability event such as post earthquake fire.  However the concept of performance 
based codes requires each potential event to be considered specifically. This can be 
either through a full probabilistic analysis, or at least through a prescriptive option 
that allows for the probability of adverse earthquake effects on the fire safety systems.  
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Robertson and Mehaffey (2000) proposed a two level design for sprinkler protected 
buildings. The first design level assumes the fire protection systems are fully 
operational. The second assumes failure or impairment of the fire safety systems and 
uses a design fire of reduced size (heat release rate) depending on the assessed system 
reliability and the required performance level of the building after the event (i.e. fully 
operational, operational, life safe). For life safety, the principal criterion is the 
reliability of the water supply. For property protection the principal considerations 
become building vulnerability (construction, environment, protection features) and 
fire service response. A minimum reduced design fire 0.25 is recommended to limit 
inappropriate reliance on vulnerable systems. 
 
Sekizawa et al. (2000) have described a probabilistic method currently under 
development to assess post-earthquake fire spread within a building. The method is 
based on observed damage in a number of locations, principally from the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake. The input to the analysis is the building geometry, construction type, fire 
safety systems, fire load density and growth rate, and earthquake peak ground 
acceleration. The model computes the probability of ignition, active system failure, 
passive system failure, and intervention to calculate the probability of fire spread. 
Output is in the form of an expected fire spread area. Life safety issues are not 
specifically considered. 
 
Feeney (2001) carried out a risk analysis on sprinkler effectiveness in multi-level steel 
framed buildings. The principal aim of the report was to consider the probability of 
structural failure.  In its consideration of post-earthquake fire, the report utilised 
available statistical data on probability of earthquake occurrence, fire ignition, 
sprinkler operation, sprinkler control of the fire, and integrity of passive fire 
protection to determine the probability of an “adverse effect” on the structure. The 
report found that the probability of structural failure due to fire is less than that for 
other required design loadings. However as consideration of life safety is not 
specifically addressed, the reports conclusions are not directly relevant to this report.. 
The probability of loss of life is likely to be much greater than the probability of 
structural collapse, and the number of persons potentially at risk in a tall building will 
give significant weighting to the consequence of the event.  
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4.6 Risk scenarios. 
 
The literature identifies a number of possible post- earthquake scenarios that present 
different critical elements in the assessment of risk of loss of life.  
 
Scawthorn (1992) focuses on the problem simultaneous ignitions during the 
earthquake. Due to the likely degradation of fire systems these may lead to 
uncontrolled fire that may threaten persons endeavouring to leave the building. In 
addition evacuation may be impeded by obstructions and damage caused by the 
earthquake. 
 
Robertson and Mehaffey (2000) conclude that most risk is caused by persons 
returning to damaged buildings with damaged fire safety systems, and note the 
potential for ignition when gas or electrical systems are restored, or due to earthquake 
after-shocks. 
 
Williamson (1999) highlights the need for fire professionals to be included in post-
earthquake inspection teams. Buildings that are assessed as structurally adequate for 
reoccupation may still have severely impaired fire safety systems. He poses the 
scenario of homeless persons re-entering a damaged building with inadequate water 
supply, and the risk of resultant out-of–control fires, including potential fire spread 
through damaged external walls to adjacent buildings.  
 
Scawthorn et al. (1998) discusses the problem of arson that often follows earthquake. 
Unauthorised entry and occupation to buildings by vagrants significantly increases the 
likelihood of ignition. Even with adequate water supplies, vacant and damaged 
buildings make fire fighting dangerous and difficult. 
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5. Performance codes for fire design 
 
5.1  General 
 
Performance based fire design is currently being adopted by many countries to replace 
the traditional prescriptive design methods. However there is no common perception 
on how performance requirements should be quantified, and the methodology adopted 
by different countries shows considerable diversity. A summary of the approaches 
adopted has recently been published by Beller et al.(2002).  
 
Traditional codes contained specific requirements detailing how buildings were to be 
constructed. They were largely based on the subjective assessment of statistical data, 
and we often amended reactively in response to historic events without any analysis of 
the risk of reoccurrence of such events. There was an implied assumption that the 
margins of safety in the prescriptive solutions were adequate to provide for occasional 
extreme events and for occasional system reliability failures. However the margins 
were not quantified, and a wide variation was likely. 
 
Performance based design requires the statement of clear performance objectives. 
Compliance with these objectives may then be checked using either a prescriptive 
solution set out in the code documents or by a fire engineering design. The use of fire 
engineering design allows the designer to determine a solution that is appropriate to a 
particular building, taking account of the specific features and requirements of the 
project.  
 
It is evident that any fire engineering analysis requires adequate and authoritative data 
and design tools to enable an assessment of the building’s performance for 
comparison with code requirements. As the adoption of performance based codes 
gathered pace, it soon became evident that there was little international agreement on 
the appropriate link between qualitative performance objectives and the quantitative 
analysis results. In addition there were insufficient comprehensive, robust, generally 
accepted techniques of modelling fire behaviour to have any confidence that 
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performance could be properly measured. These restraints are discussed more fully in 
the following sections. 
 
5.2 Quantifying performance regulations 
 
There is no generally accepted policy on whether quantified values should be included 
in the building regulations. (Beller et al. 2002).  Some countries regard the regulations 
as purely a statement of public policy, which should be independent of the changing 
knowledge and design methods. Other countries include quantitative requirements in 
the regulations, while some use reference to other quantitative documents to be used 
as verification methods. 
 
The purpose of the performance design is to assess the building performance against 
the qualitative performance expectations in the code. At some point in the process the 
performance must be quantified to enable this assessment. Otherwise the fire engineer 
and the approving authority are required to reach their own subjective interpretation 
of the policy statement, which may or may not reflect society’s expectations. This 
could not only lead to considerable difficulty in achieving approval of particular 
designs, but could also make either or both parties vulnerable to legal challenge and 
liability. 
 
 In addition it is known that the acceptable measure of risk is not constant for all 
situations, and is related to a number of social perceptions. Wolski (2001) identified 
the factors involved and discusses the importance of risk perception in determining 
acceptable levels of risk in various situations. For loss of life in fire the most 
important perceptions are the severity of the risk (number of persons involved) and 
the controllability (who controls the risk?). For instance, the loss of ten lives in a 
single event in a high-rise building is perceived to be less acceptable than the loss of 
ten lives in individual house fires. 
 
 5.3  Demonstrating compliance. 
 
Most performance codes allow compliance to be established either by use of a 
prescriptive “acceptable solution” or using fire engineering design.   Fire engineering 
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design may be used to compare the proposed solution with alternative options, or to 
measure performance in absolute terms. However there is a clear need for prescriptive 
solutions to have a sound technical basis if they are to achieve satisfy performance 
requirements (Custer and Ashe, 2002). This is particularly important where the 
prescriptive solution is to be used as a guide to assess alternative solutions. 
  
Most buildings are likely to designed using prescriptive codes for reasons that include 
familiarity, ease of implementation and design economy (Averill 1998). Performance 
design has significant design costs and may also require negotiation with the 
approving authority. However significant costs savings can be achieved in system 
installation on appropriate projects. 
 
Often a simple comparative assessment using a limited number of design fire 
scenarios will be adequate for assessing the equivalence of different system 
components.  However for major or innovative projects, there are potential advantages 
in measuring performance of complete system in absolute terms.  This would require 
a full probabilistic risk analysis as described below.  
 
5.4  Probabilistic risk analysis 
 
The basis of any comprehensive fire engineered design must be a probabilistic risk 
analysis of potential fire scenarios to determine within an acceptable probability 
whether the performance objectives have been met. 
 
The key factors in determining risk have been identified be Meacham (2001) as 
• Fire Hazard Assessment 
• Consequence Identification and Valuation 
• Risk Characterisation  
• Forming Judgement on the Likelihood of Occurrence 
• Uncertainty, Variability and Indeterminacy 
 
The risk assessment procedure therefore consists of the predicting the probability of 
occurrence of an appropriate number of fire scenarios and the effect of these on the 
 36 
building and its occupants, taking account of the reliability of the system and building 
elements, and the uncertainty of the assumptions used in the analysis. 
 
5.5 Design scenarios 
 
For the simple consideration of alternative fire system options, examination of a 
limited number of fire scenarios may be adequate to confirm comparative levels of 
performance 
 
However for significant projects, and to get a meaningful overall measure of 
performance and the full benefit of an engineered solution, the risk analysis must 
include consideration of all fire event scenarios that could have a significant 
contribution to the total measured risk. Rare events with high consequences should be 
considered as well as frequent events with less potential for performance failure. 
 
The design scenarios must allow for the reliability of systems as well as the 
uncertainties in the analysis and design assumptions. System failures do occur, and 
the output effects from real fires can exceed those from deign fires, and these factors 
must be incorporated in the analysis.  
 
5.6 System redundancy. 
 
While the probabilistic risk analysis enables the reliability of the total interacting fire 
safety system to be assessed, most authorities agree that complete reliance on a single 
system is unwise and inappropriate.  
 
The principal concern for modern tall buildings must be the significant use of system 
trade offs. While there is little doubt that sprinklers are the most effective form of fire 
protection available, there is a danger that an unacceptable reliance on the sprinkler 
system could leave the building occupants with severely reduced passive protection in 
the event of a system failure. This is of particular relevance in post earthquake fire 
where sprinkler systems are known to be seismically vulnerable. 
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Simenko(2002) promotes the “defence in depth” philosophy to limit  reliance on  a 
single system, noting that a single component failure can compromise the whole 
system. He advocates designs that include redundancy, diversity and independence of 
systems, including defences against human error. 
 
Bukowski (1997) notes that many significant fires involve a series of failures that 
contribute to the event, and it is important to consider worst-case scenarios to set 
extreme boundaries for performance. He reports that the U S Department of Energy 
requires that one part of the fire hazard analysis for their facilities is to assume both 
that the automatic systems fail and that the fire department does not respond.  While 
this represents an extreme case, which may not be appropriate for many buildings, the 
general philosophy of considering a system failure will ensure that inappropriate 
reliance is not placed on a single fire protection measure. 
 
The NFPA Life Safety Code (NFPA, 2000) sets out a number of design scenarios it 
recommends for a performance based design. These include consideration of the 
independent failure of each fire safety system. These scenarios may not be required 
only if the approving authority believes that “…. the level of reliability of the system 
and the design performance in the absence of the system are acceptable.” 
 
5.7 State of the art. 
 
The reluctance in many countries to including formal quantitative performance in the 
regulations is largely a reflection of the state of the art of fire engineering, both in 
terms of design methodology and performance assessment.   
 
In the 1996 Australian Fire Engineering Guidelines (FCRCL,1996), probabilistic 
analysis methods were recommended as a useful method for comparison of the 
performance of various fire safety systems. However use of the method on an absolute 
basis was not recommended as a measure of estimated losses against acceptable 
community expectations.   This concern reflected the significant technical and social 
issues still to be resolved. 
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Custer and Meacham (1997) identified specific constraining factors that include the 
variation in methodology available, the lack of data, the lack of credible analysis and 
design tools, and the relationship of the methodology to the regulatory performance 
requirements. While there were a number of useful design guides available (Buchanan 
1995 and SFPE, 1995), there was no generally accepted framework for fire analysis 
and design.    
 
By the year 2002, Johnson (2002) was able to comment on the good progress 
achieved in design, analysis and technology over the previous five years. However he 
identified design fires and human behaviour in egress as key elements for further 
research in the area of modelling input data. He also noted that significant challenges 
still remained in the policy, regulatory, approval and accreditation areas. 
  
Harrington and Puchovsky (2002) expressed concerns that many of the current 
calculation methods and models are prone to inappropriate use without an 
understanding of the assumptions, purpose or limitations of the model, resulting in 
erroneous output. 
 
Johnson (2002) also highlighted the need for comprehensive risk/cost models. 
Absolute safety cannot be achieved, so the code must ensure that the risk perceptions 
and values of society are reflected in the performance requirements. 
 
5.8 Economic considerations 
 
Averill (1998) examined the private and social cost implications. He suggested that 
most buildings would continue to be designed using prescriptive designs for a number 
of reasons including design familiarity and simplicity, economy of the approval 
process and ease of implementation. Performance based designs can have significant 
design costs and may require negotiation with the approving authority. Costs of 
construction, maintenance and system management are also likely to be lower where 
standard systems of known performance are utilised. 
 
In many cases the engineered performance based designs will be based on a 
competitive quote, and both the design process and the engineered solution are likely 
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to be a bottom line performance for the particular building. This could lead to 
different fire safety levels for otherwise similar buildings, and have significant 
implications on the future use and operation of the building. Averill identified 
potential external costs associated with this aspect of design, which could reduce the 
net saving to society. These include issues of loss and liability, and could lead to 
increased insurance, property transaction and regulatory costs if there is a perceived 
need to determine and verify the risk level for each individual building. The impact of 




In spite of recent progress in fire engineering, there are still significant challenges 
remaining to achieve universally accepted design methodologies and performance 
measures. However with many countries now moving to develop performance-based 
codes, it is anticipated that there will be continuing rapid development over the next 
few years to a point where an authoritative and generally accepted design 
methodology will be available.  
 
It is likely that performance based design can achieve significant cost savings in many 
situations. However it is important that the implementation process takes account of 
the long term costs to society and future owners as well as the immediate cost of 







6.0 New Zealand regulatory requirements. 
 
 6.1 The Building Act 1991 
 
The Building Act 1991 (New Zealand Government, 1991) is the national regulatory 
document for building control in New Zealand. The Building Act establishes a 
hierarchy of documents to define and demonstrate compliance with the requirements 
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                                                Functional Requirement 
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Acceptable solutions                   Alternative solutions 
     Prescriptive solution from          using Verification Methods  
        the Approved Documents          from the Approved Documents 
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As shown in Figure 6.1, the hierarchy of documents is 
• The Building Act 1991 
• The Building Regulations 1992 (New Zealand Government, 1992) 
• The New Zealand Building Code Handbook and Approved Documents (BIA, 
1992 and 2000). 
 
The Act establishes the Building Industry Authority (BIA) as the statutory authority 
responsible for administration of the Act. The BIA’s duties include advising on 
amendments to the building code, and approving documents for establishing 
compliance. 
Section 6 of the Act includes the requirement that, “in determining the extent to which 
matters……..shall be under control, due regard shall be had to the national costs and 
benefits of any control…...”  This provision gives the BIA the discretion to consider 
economic matters in determining an acceptable appropriate performance level to meet 
code provisions. . 
 
Section 49 of the Act authorises the BIA to prepare or approve, in whole or in part, 
and subject to any modifications it considers necessary, any document for use in 
establishing compliance with the building code. This allows the BIA to amend any 
documents which it considers to be not relevant to, or to exceed the performance 
requirements of the code.  
 
Section 44 of the Act sets provisions for the continuing safe use of buildings by way 
of regular inspection, maintenance and reporting of building systems. This includes 
systems of particular relevance to this report such as sprinkler systems, warning 
devices, automatic fire doors, lifts, mechanical ventilation and pressurisation systems, 







6.2 The Building Regulations 1992. 
 
The Building Regulations 1992 include the Building Code as Schedule 1. This is a 
performance-based document, which sets out a hierarchy of requirements for each 
element of building performance. These are: 
• Objective 
• Functional Requirement 
• Performance 
Appendices B and C of this report contain the New Zealand Building Code clauses for 
fire safety and structural design. 
 
The building owner is free to use any materials, components or construction methods 
which can be shown to meet the relevant performance criteria of the code.  
 
6.3 The New Zealand Building Code Handbook and Approved 
Documents 
 
The Code Handbook and Approved Documents detail general options for 
demonstrating compliance with code provisions.  These include use of Acceptable 
Solutions, or the preparation by the building owner of an Alternative Solution.  
 
Acceptable Solutions contain detailed prescriptive requirements, which the regulatory 
authority is bound to accept as meeting the performance standards of the Building 
Code. These are set out in the Approved Documents for each element of the building 
work. The Acceptable Solutions may also be used as guidelines to assess the 
performance level of any Alternative Solution proposed for the building. 
 
Alternative Solutions use materials, components or construction methods that differ 
from the Acceptable Solutions. It is the responsibility of the building owner to supply 
the regulatory authority with sufficient evidence for the authority to believe “ on 
reasonable grounds” that the performance objectives will be met. 
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 Verification Methods given in the Approved Documents provide approved means of 
demonstrating that an Alternative Solution will provide a satisfactory level of 
performance. This may be by appropriate testing or by calculation using accepted 
methods of analysis 
 
In addition the Handbook lists default procedures for the inspection and maintenance 
of building systems to ensure continuing satisfactory performance. 
 
6.4 Fire design  
 
The design of buildings for fire is included in clauses C1 to C4 of the Building Code. 
The clauses are; 
Clause C1 : Outbreak of Fire 
Clause C2 : Means of Escape 
Clause C3 : Spread of Fire 
Clause C4 : Structural Stability during Fire 
The clauses are reproduced in Appendix B of this report.  
 
The general objective of these provisions is to safeguard people from injury or illness 
while escaping from a fire or during fire fighting operations, and to and to protect 
household units and other property from the effects of fire. 
 
It should be noted that the objectives include for protection of adjacent household 
units and other property (defined as land or buildings or part thereof which are not 
held under the same allotment, or not held under the same ownership - and includes 
any road). The code does not provide for protection of the owners property, and any 
such provision will be at the owner’s request. 
 
In addition the Building Code includes three other clauses relevant to building fire 
safety; 
Clause F6 : Lighting for Emergency 
Clause F7 : Warning Systems 
Clause F8 : Signs 
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An Acceptable Solution giving prescriptive requirements for each clause is contained 
in the Approved Documents. These include reference to New Zealand Standards for 
fire safety systems and test methods for fire related properties.  
 
There is no verification method for fire design in the Approved Documents. This can 
be seen as a reflection of the “state of the art” of performance based fire engineering, 
as discussed in section 5 of this report. 
 
6.5 Structural design. 
 
The requirements for structural design of buildings are covered in Clause B1 : 
Structure. 
 
The objective of this provision is safeguard people from injury or loss of amenity 
caused by structural behaviour, and to protect other property from damage. The clause 
is reproduced in full in Appendix C of this report. 
 
In contrast to fire design, Clause B1: Structure has a prescriptive Acceptable Solution 
for minor buildings and building elements only.  All major buildings require 
engineering design to the appropriate Verification Method given in the code.  This 
includes reference to the New Zealand Code of Practice for General Structural Design 
and Design Loadings for Buildings (The Loading Code), NZS 4203:1992 (SNZ, 
1992), and to various engineering material design codes and standards. The Loading 
Code has a section on the seismic design of building parts. This includes requirements 
for connections of permanent services equipment, but not for the equipment itself. 
 
Seismic design of fire protection equipment is generally covered by the New Zealand 
Standard Specification for Seismic Resistance of Engineering Systems in Buildings, 
NZS 4219:1983 (SNZ, 1983). This standard includes provision to design fire 
protection systems for earthquake loads, and to design other systems to minimise 
potential ignition sources and damage that could affect egress or fire fighting. Seismic 
design of sprinkler systems is included in New Zealand Standard for Fire Sprinkler 
Systems, NZS 4541:1996 (SNZ, 1996). Both these standards refer back to the 
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Loading Code NZS 4203 for design actions, and both also allow alternative 
prescriptive design options. 
 
The previous Loading Code referenced in NZS 4219 is now obsolete, and the current 
code is significantly different in many respects. The two documents are no longer 
compatible, and there is considerable uncertainty on appropriate design load 
derivations. In addition recent research indicates that the prescriptive design options 
will often be exceeded. Botting and Buchanan (1998) give a detailed summary of the 
current unsatisfactory situation. 
 
A new draft of NZS 4219 has been prepared which addresses some of these concerns 
(Beattie, 2001). However this document is now on hold pending the completion of a 
new Loading Code. This should ensure that the documents are compatible and 
consistent in their requirements. Unfortunately however it is likely that the adoption 
of the amended document may be some time away.  
 
The current Loading Code has two levels of earthquake loading, one for the 
assessment of potential injury or loss of life due to structural failure (the ultimate limit 
state), and one for loss of amenity due to earthquake shaking (the serviceability limit 
state). The earthquake event specified for the serviceability limit state is only one 
sixth of the shaking intensity required for ultimate limit state design. This represents a 
relatively small earthquake of about ten years return period.  
 
The Loading Code lists fire as one of the physical conditions to be considered in 
assessing building stability. It gives load combinations and safety factors for structural 
design to be used in fire emergency situations. The material design standards contain 
sections on fire design, which give basic simple relationships to relate material 
properties to fire temperature. Where appropriate, reference may be made to more 
detailed presentations (Buchanan, 2001b, SFPE ,1995), or to the references listed in 






6.6 The Fire Service Act 1975  
 
The Fire Service Act (New Zealand Government, (1975) requires the New Zealand 
Fire Service to ensure that the owner of any significant building makes provision for 
an evacuation scheme to the approval of the Fire Service. The scheme is to include the 
appointment of building and floor wardens, trial evacuations at prescribed intervals, 
monitoring of means of escape, and special provision for specific occupant groups 
(elderly, disabled etc.) where appropriate to the building function.  The evacuation 




The Acceptable Solution for fire design does not mention post-earthquake damage to 
fire safety systems as a consideration in fire in design. There is a presumption that, if 
the fire safety systems are designed for the earthquake loadings as required in the 
structural sections of the code, the risk of not meeting the code performance is 
insignificant. However the confusing and contradictory requirements in the system 
design standards cast some doubt on this assumption. There is also some confusion 
regarding the required performance levels for the systems. This concern is examined 
further in the following section. 
 
It is also evident that, in the absence of a quantified verification method for fire 
design, the Acceptable Solution will be used as a measure of alternative designs. It is 
therefore important that the Acceptable Solution has a sound technical basis, such that 
it can be shown to provide solutions that meet the performance criteria of the code. 













The Acceptable Solution for fire design C/AS1:2000 (BIA : 2000) contains 
prescriptive measures for fire safety in buildings. Sections include: 
• Introduction 
• Occupant numbers and purpose groups 
• Means of escape 
• Requirements for firecells 
• Fire resistance ratings 
• Control of internal fire and smoke spread 
• Control of external fire spread 
• Fire fighting 
• Outbreak of fire 
Many of the requirements of the Acceptable Solution are by way of reference to other 
code sections and to prescriptive New Zealand standards for alarm and detection 
systems, emergency lighting, and fire performance testing. 
 
7.2 Fire resistance ratings 
 
The Acceptable Solution uses two systems for fire rating building elements, 
depending on their application. These are designated as F (firecell) ratings and S 
(structural) ratings.  
 
F ratings apply to elements required to protect building occupants during evacuation 
and fire fighting. The F rating are assessed on the likely time required to evacuate the 
building, and are based on the escape height and whether a sprinkler system is 
installed to control fire growth. 
 
S ratings apply to elements required to maintain structural stability for protection of 
other property. The ratings are based on the burn-out time of the firecells. The ratings 
given in the document are obtained from a modified Eurocode expression (Eurocode, 
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1966), which includes consideration of firecell dimensions, thermal properties and 




Trade-offs are provisions in prescriptive codes, which allow reductions in passive fire 
ratings (or relaxation in other requirements) if active systems are installed.  Most 
trade-off provisions relate to sprinkler systems, and these have been increasingly 
incorporated in prescriptive codes since the 1970s. Barnes (1997) summarised the 
history of sprinkler trade-offs in New Zealand and compared the provisions with 
codes in Australia, Canada and the US (UBC). Robertson (2001) notes that there 
approximately 60 identifiable trade-offs or relaxations in current Canadian codes. 
 
 The New Zealand Acceptable Solution has been further revised since Barnes’ report, 
and has extended the requirement for mandatory sprinklers to additional building 
types (especially residential buildings) with corresponding trade-off reductions in 
passive system requirements. 
 
A summary of some of the trade-offs in the Acceptable Solution are as follows. 
Where sprinklers are fitted; 
• Reduced total width of escape routes (one exit discounted without sprinklers). 
• Longer permissible escape routes (100% increase) 
• No holding capacity required for protected paths 
• Less fire separation required to external escape routes (50% reduction) 
• Increased permissible escape height for single stair ( 150% increase) 
• Unlimited firecell areas      
• Reduced structural fire endurance rating (S rating).(50%)   
• Reduced fire rating for firecell elements (F rating) (50%)   
• Non- insulated glazing allowed in fire separations   
• Non-insulated glazing allowed in safe paths   
• No smoke separations required in vertical safe paths    
• Longer corridors permitted without separation (50% increase) 
• Increased areas of hidden roof and ceiling space   
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• Reduction in interior surface finish fire spread requirements 
• Increased allowable unprotected area in external walls (100% increase) 
• Reduced length required for wing walls or return walls (50%) 
• Vertical fire spread from lower roof may be ignored. 
• Vertical fire spread from lower levels of same building may be ignored. 
 
In addition there are further trade offs available for other active systems. These 
include; 
• Longer permissible escape routes (with heat or smoke detectors) 
• Increased area of intermediate floors (with smoke control system) 
• Low hazard activities permitted in safe paths (with smoke detectors) 
• Reduction in smoke control capacity of some doors (with 
pressurisation) 
 
Also of note is the amended allowable received radiation at boundaries, which has 
been increased above normally accepted values based on the likelihood of fire service 
intervention. 
 
As can be seen from the above summary, there are some significant concessions 
allowed, particularly in sprinklered buildings. This is, in part, a reflection of the 
excellent record of sprinkler performance in Australia and New Zealand. (Marryatt, 
1988). 
 
7.4 Tall buildings. 
 
Requirements for fire safety systems for firecells are given in Tables 4.1/1 to 4.1/5 of 
the Acceptable Solutions and are included in Appendix D of this report. 
 
The following is a summary of the general requirements of the Acceptable Solutions 
for buildings over 25 metres height. 
All buildings are to include the following features; 
• Sprinkler protection. 
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Figure 7.1 : Fire safety system requirements 




• At least two means of escape. 
• An F rating of 30 minutes, increasing to 60 minutes at 58 metre height. 
• Fire Service lift control. 
• Emergency lighting in exitways. 
• A fire hydrant system. 
 
In addition, all office, commercial and storage type uses are to have; 
• Smoke detectors if over 46 metres height. 
• Safe path pressurisation if over 46 metres height 
• Smoke control in air handling systems if over 34 metres height 
• Refuge areas at every third floor in safe paths if over 58 metres height 
• Fire system centres for Fire Service control if over 58 metres 
 
These requirements are for office buildings with less than 501 persons per floor, and 
are summarised in Figure 7.1. 
 
Requirements for multi-unit apartments buildings are similar. All require smoke 
detectors and all apartments are to open onto a safe path. 
 
7.5 Post–earthquake performance of fire safety systems 
 
The Acceptable Solution for fire does not mention post-earthquake damage to fire 
safety systems as a consideration in fire in design. There is a presumption that, if the 
fire safety systems are designed for the earthquake loadings specified elsewhere in the 
code, the risk of not meeting the code performance for post earthquake fire is 
insignificant. 
 
As noted in section 6, requirements for earthquake design of fire safety systems are 
contained in NZS 4203, NZS 4541 and NZS 4219.  NZS 4219 (SNZ, 1983) requires 
the building designer to consider the effect of earthquake on fire protection systems, 
public utilities, non-structural elements and other potential hazards as they relate to 
protection of life and property and safe egress from the building. However, as noted in 
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section 6.5, there is confusion regarding application of the requirements due to code 
changes and inconsistencies.  
 
There is also uncertainty about the required level of earthquake loading for fire 
protection systems.  The wording of the Building Code performance requirements 
would suggest that the serviceability limit state is appropriate for design of fire safety 
systems. Unfortunately, as noted previously, this would provide a very limited level of 
protection, even in a moderate earthquake.  
 
Clearly the potential failure of fire protection systems is a life safety consideration, 
and the BIA has recognised this ambiguity in design requirements. They have 
published an opinion (BIA, 1993) that these systems should be designed for a load 
midway between the ultimate limit state and the serviceability limit state. This 
compromise would significantly improve the reliability of the systems, but it is not a 
requirement of the approved documents and therefore cannot be required for 
compliance. 
 
And even where prescriptive load options are given they have been shown to be 
inadequate to ensure survival of the systems in a design earthquake. (Beattie, 2000 
and Botting and Buchanan, 1998). 
 
In addition to requirements for requirements for seismic restraint, the New Zealand 
Standard for Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems, NZS 4541:1996 (SNZ, 1996) also 
contains a provision to increase the reliability of water supply for sprinkler systems in 
the earthquake prone areas. All systems in areas with moderate seismic activity are to 
have two independent water supplies, of which one shall be independent of the town 
main reticulation.   However the BIA, as part of their approval of NZS 4541 as a 
means of compliance, have deleted this provision. In the worst case this could result 
in a building being dependent on both a fully operational external water and electric 
power supply for reliable sprinkler operation. The adoption by the BIA of this 
minimum standard water supply for sprinkler systems assumes a high level of 
earthquake reliability for the utility systems. All evidence suggests that this 
assumption is not realistic, but no guidance is given on how the designer is to address 
the potential vulnerability of these systems. 
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 7.6 Document Status 
 
The lack of a verification method for fire safety design leaves the regulatory authority 
in the difficult position of having to measure the building performance in fire against 
an unquantified requirement. The generally accepted default procedure is to assess the 
performance against the prescriptive Acceptable Solution. However this gives no 
indication of the true level of safety or assurance against failure. There are also a 
number of apparent inconsistencies in the Acceptable Solution, and the absence of the 
technical background material makes it difficult to assess the applicability of the 
requirements to any specific situation. 
 
In addition, the cost/benefit consideration from section 6 of the Building Act has been 
presented as justification for some recent amendments to the Acceptable Solutions. In 
some of cases the benefit of the changes appears arguable. And as the actual 
cost/benefit calculations have not been made available, no useful quantitative 
information about performance can be inferred. 
 
There is therefore some understandable resistance from some fire engineers to 
reference their designs to the acceptable solutions, an approach which they see as 
unnecessarily restrictive.  However the BIA have made the following pertinent 
observations in a recent formal determination (BIA, 2002). 
a. Some acceptable solutions cover the worst case so that in less extreme 
cases they may be modified and the resulting alternative solutions will still 
comply with the code. 
b. Usually, however, when there is non- compliance with one provision of the 
acceptable solution it will be necessary to add some other provision to 
compensate for that in order to comply with the building code. 
 
In the same determination, the BIA reported a New Zealand High Court decision, that 
held that BIA was entitled to use the Acceptable Solution as a “guideline or 
benchmark” to compliance. 
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These precedents appear to support the use of the Acceptable Solution as a measure of 
performance for alternative designs, at least until quantified performance criteria are 
incorporated in the code. 
 
A study group was established in 1989 by the Australian Fire Code Reform Centre to 
develop and validate risk assessment models for cost effective fire safety design. In a 
recent review of the group’s recommendations (Custer and Ashe, 2002) the 
establishment of a technical basis for prescriptive requirements was identified as an 
important factor if they are to be linked in a meaningful way to performance 
objectives. This process would remove the uncertainty currently surrounding the 
performance and cost effectiveness of the prescriptive solutions. This is particularly 
relevant when the Acceptable Solution is the only quantified performance criteria 





It is evident that tall buildings designed to these prescriptive requirements depend on a 
number of both active and passive systems for life safety and property protection. It is 
also evident that many of these systems are susceptible to damage in a major 
earthquake, and that many depend on vulnerable external utilities (water supply, 
power, communications) for proper functioning. The apparent assumption in the 
Acceptable Solution of adequate reliability of the safety systems may be 
inappropriate.  
 
As detailed above the Acceptable Solution incorporates many trade off relaxations, 
particularly in sprinklered buildings. There is little doubt that sprinklers are the most 
effective form of fire protection available. However there is a danger that an 
unacceptable reliance may be placed on seismically vulnerable systems, which could 
leave the building occupants with little protection from fire after a significant 
earthquake. As noted by Barnes (1997), a 50% trade off reduction in the rating of a 
fire separation could reduce its safety factor from a respectable 2.0 to a close to failure 
situation should the sprinkler system fail to operate. 
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In addition the fire resistant barriers themselves may well be prone to damage due to 
inadequate design requirements for limits on earthquake deflections. 
 
In view of the earthquake prone environment found in many parts of New Zealand, it 
would seem appropriate that post-earthquake fire should be included as part of a 
comprehensive multi-scenario risk assessment of fire safety. This would allow the 
contribution of the possible seismic event to the overall fire risk to be properly 
quantified and assessed. The potentially high consequences of a post earthquake fire, 
particularly in tall buildings, make it a scenario that should not be ignored. While the 
current state of the art makes a full absolute performance analysis unrealistic, the 
methodology can still be used to compare a design against the Acceptable Solutions or 
an alternative solution. 
 
However the uncertainty of the level of performance of design to the Acceptable 











Most modern seismic building codes contain some provision for seismic restraint of 
building fittings and equipment, and appropriate separation of non-structural elements 
that are vulnerable to earthquake damage. However a number of recent reports have 
indicated that an appropriate level of performance is not always being achieved. The 
reasons for this include inadequate code provisions, lack of design coordination 
between building and equipment designers, and poor or inappropriate detailing.  
 
This section of the report considers specifically the systems and utilities that make the 
major contribution to fire safety in a modern tall building, and endeavours to quantify 
the reliability for use in a risk analysis in the following section of this report. The 
systems to be reviewed are; 
• Sprinkler system reticulation 
• Sprinkler system water supply 
• Smoke control systems 
• Passive protection. 
 
Alarm systems may become ineffective during an earthquake due to non-activation or 
false alarm activation. However it is suggested that people are likely to evacuate the 
damaged building as quickly as possible, and will be alert and aware of the potential 
fire risk. For the purpose of the risk analysis, it is assumed that the absence of reliable 
alarms will not materially affect the life safety of building occupants. However it is 
obviously important that damaged buildings should not be re-occupied until the alarm 
systems are confirmed as operational. 
 
The following sections discuss the normal operational reliability of the systems as 




8.2 Sprinkler system reticulation. 
The issue of the reliability of sprinkler systems in normal operational situations has 
been the focus of considerable discussion, with reliabilities as low as 81% found in 
some studies (Budnick, 2001).  95% confidence limits recommended by Budnick for 
commercial use in the US are in the range 88.1 to 98.1 %.  However Feeney (2001) 
has argued that systems in Australia and New Zealand have a significantly higher 
reliability, and recommends a failure probability of 99.83%. This figure, which 
includes an allowance for system isolation for alteration or maintenance, is consistent 
with previous research by Marryat (1988), and is justified mainly due to the additional 
self-monitoring features and the high level of inspection and testing required in these 
countries. The Australian guideline document (FCRCL, 1996) recommends 99% for 
flashover fires and 95% for non-flashover situations. 
 
Experience in the US indicates that most sprinkler systems remained intact in recent 
earthquakes, and that seismic bracing where installed was generally effective. 
However some bracing failures were reported in the Northridge earthquake (Fleming, 
1998) and, as previously noted, current prescriptive standards do not make adequate 
provision for seismic restraint of sprinkler systems. Both Fleming (1998) in the US, 
and Beattie (2000) in New Zealand noted that the systems were subject to seismic 
accelerations significantly greater than the required design values. The New Zealand 
Sprinkler Code NZS 4541:1996 (SNZ, 1996) permits a default value of 1.0g for 
design. This is considerably less that the values of over 3g obtained by modelling 
buildings to the current New Zealand code, and measured in recent California 
earthquakes (Shelton et al. 2002). The provision is clearly inadequate in some 
situations. 
 
Porter and Scawthorn (1998) determined a 2% (approx.) probability of failure for a 
retrofitted system in San Francisco for a 0.4g PGA earthquake (equiv to a 475 return 
period event). For an unbraced system the probability of failure rose to 50%. These 
probabilities were based on observed median failure acceleration of 2.6g for braced 
systems compared with 0.72g for unbraced.  
 
 61 
Robertson and Mehaffey (2000) used a reliability index of 80 – 100% for post-
earthquake system reliability in their performance-based assessment. This value 
assumes a water supply designed to a significantly higher seismic loading such that it 
is not a significantly contributing failure element. 
 
Feeney (2001) adopted a probability of failure of 40% for a design level earthquake in 
his risk assessment for a NZ building. This figure takes account of concerns regarding 
design and installation as expressed above. 
8.3 Sprinkler system water supply. 
Under normal conditions, municipal water supplies are highly reliable. Feeney (2001) 
analysed water supply data from Auckland and Melbourne to derive an annual 
probability of 99.992% that water will be available at the normal pressure and flow 
rate. Reliability of supply to the sprinkler system will significantly increase for 
independent dual supply systems. 
 
However experience in many earthquakes has demonstrated that municipal water 
supplies have a high probability of failure during an earthquake. Of the fifteen 
significant earthquakes reported in Botting and Buchanan (2000), only one appears to 
have no reported major damage to water supplies.  Two recent New Zealand reports 
(Brunsdon and Clark, 2000 and Christchurch Lifelines Group, 1997) identified a high 
vulnerability in the local water supplies to a “moderate” seismic event (150 year 
return period, assessed as MM8).  
And while a number of modern tall buildings will have a secondary supply, this may 
itself be dependent on the reliability and adequate restraint of a number of other 
elements including pumps, supply tanks, control panels and emergency power supply.  
Robertson and Mehaffey (2000) suggest post-earthquake reliability levels for 
sprinkler systems that vary from up to 80% for water from a reliable on-site pumped 
storage (designed to operate under the design level earthquake) to between 0% to 35% 
for a municipal supply considered at risk (under the design level earthquake). 
Feeney (2002) has recommended reliability levels of 54% for a dual system with 
seismic designed primary water supply (Type A  supply to NZS 4541:1996 (SNZ, 
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1996)) reducing to 1% for a system dependent on the municipal supply and/or electric 
booster pumps. (Type C supply to NZS 4541:1996). 
8.4 Smoke control systems 
FCRCL (1996) reported that the probability of successful functioning of smoke 
management systems may be less than 50%, and noted that the more complex the 
systems the lower the reliability. Klote and Milke (1992) estimated the mean life 
before failure of commissioned systems as varying from 116 months for a system with 
3 fans and no other components to 3 months for a system with 5 fans and 54 other 
components. Even with stringent inspection and maintenance procedures are in place, 
these figures must be of concern, particularly when the presence of the system is used 
to trade off for smoke separations.  Obviously systems should be kept as simple as 
possible. For the simple system of not more than three fans and no other components, 
Klote and Milke estimate a reliability of 97% before commissioning.  
Inspection and testing of mechanical systems in New Zealand is carried out by 
Independently Qualified Persons (IQPs) registered by the territorial authorities. The 
procedures for inspection and testing are submitted for approval as part of the building 
consent application. Usually the default procedures from the Building Handbook are 
specified, but extended and more detailed provisions are often submitted for 
sophisticated systems. However it is evident that in some cases the IQP is not familiar 
with the operational requirements of the system, and do not use the approved 
procedures for testing. This may have significant implication on the reliability of the 
system. 
Dixon (1999) noted that the effective performance of smoke control systems is 
dependent on accurate data on building leakage. Any damage to doors and enclosures 
may significantly reduce the level of performance. 
Where the systems do not have an emergency power supply, they are vulnerable to the 
loss of reticulated supply in an earthquake. The NZ Building Code Acceptable 
Solution requires emergency supply for crowd and some sleeping activities only, and 
then only for buildings over 58 metres height. 
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Feeney (2001) researched the New Zealand situation and has estimated the probability 
that power will be available after a design earthquake as 10%. 
Botting (1998) reports loss of electric supply over significant areas in most the 
earthquakes reviewed. Brunsdon and Clark (2000) and Christchurch Lifelines Group 
(1997) predict short-term power outages in New Zealand locations under the 150 year 
(approx) return period “moderate” earthquake.  
8.5 Passive protection. 
The main concern in the reliability of passive protection is the presence of 
inadequately fire- protected penetrations for building services and the presence of 
ineffective fire and smoke doors.  Barnes (1997) reports on a survey of Wellington 
NZ office buildings carried out in the late 1980s, that found that over 24% of fire 
doors were removed or wedged open. It is considered that the increased awareness of 
fire safety issues, more effective automatic closers, the introduction magnetic hold-
open devices, and the more rigorous inspection procedures introduced by recent 
legislation will have significantly reduced this number. The Australian design guide 
(FCRCL, 1996) suggests a reliability of 95% for separations with no openings 
reducing to 90% for openings with automatic closers. This implies a 5% probability 
that the door closers will not operate successfully. 
Damage to non-structural enclosures in earthquake results from forced deflections 
imposed on the elements as the building deflects. The performance will depend on the 
flexibility of the building as well as the details of the enclosure panels, such as aspect 
ratio, presence of doors and penetrations, and degree of edge restraint from the main 
structure. The maximum permissible drift ratios in the NZ Loading Code (SNZ, 1992) 
are 0.015 to 0.020 (depending on height) for the ultimate limit state and 0.0025 for the 
serviceability limit state.  
Tests quoted by Porter et al. (2001) indicate that visible damage can be expected at a 
drift ratio of 0.004. Although this is not the ultimate drift that the panels can sustain it 
represents the value at which smoke spread could be expected through cracking and 
gaps due to dislodged stopping plaster. Fire spread could occur at a drift ratio of 
0.0085 when the plasterboard is likely to separate from the framing.  Sekizawa et al. 
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(2000) quotes Japanese recommendations of a 50% reduction in effective fire 
resistance for partitions subject to a transient drift of .0033.  
Brunsdon and Clark (2000) analysed a typical modern New Zealand concrete frame 
building subject to a “moderate” earthquake and found maximum drift ratios of 
0.0042, implying a value under ultimate design level load of 0.0073.  
It can be seen that smoke penetration may be expected in partitions in flexible 
buildings after a moderate earthquake, and the fire integrity will be lost at drift ratios 
well below ultimate load deflections unless the partitions are separated from the 
structure. Successful structural separation depends on properly designed and detailed, 
high performance, fire resistant seismic joints (James and Buchanan, 2000). 
 
 8.6 Passive protection – real fire reliability 
Fire testing of elements is traditionally carried out in standard furnaces using the ISO 
834 or equivalent standard time-temperature curve. This has the advantage inherent in 
an internationally recognised standard test procedure, which allows comparison of fire 
tests carried out in many different locations.  
The ISO 834 test dates back to the 1930s, and is based on cellulose fuels. The 
significant change in the type of materials used today, especially modern plastics, 
have called into question the validity of the ISO 834 test. The specific concern to be 
addressed is whether an element tested to a certain rating will achieve that rating in a 
real fire. As the standard test ratings are typically used in calculations of, for instance, 
safe escape times, it is imperative that the test designations are realistic. 
Recent publications by Jones (2001) and Nyman (2002 ) have reported on furnace 
tests with more realistic time-temperature curves and found that assemblies can fail at 
a time considerably less than the standard test rating. Some compartment tests based 
on upholstered furniture fires showed times to failure of less than 50% of the times 
predicted by standard fire exposure tests. Based on his test results, Nyman has 
proposed a relationship for time-to-failure for non-load bearing walls based on the 
cumulative radiant energy reaching the wall.  
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To identify key issues affecting the post- earthquake fire safety of tall buildings. 
 
To examine the level of protection from post- earthquake fire provided in a tall 




A rigorous analysis of post earthquake fire risk is a complex, multi-variable problem. 
Earthquake damage may significantly affect many of the typical fire scenario 
parameters including probability of ignition and fire growth, probability of 
intervention, the reliability of the active and passive fire safety systems, and the ease 
of evacuation.  
 
The analysis must also consider the probability of an earthquake of given intensity 
and estimate the probability of damage to the various systems. Simplistic assessments 
based on general fire statistics, including risk ranking (Gretner, FSES, etc.) are 
therefore not appropriate. However a comprehensive probabilistic risk analysis is 
outside the scope of this report, and is probably not justified in terms of the current 
knowledge of likely damage levels. 
 
The aim of this section of the report is to carry out a simple analysis for a number of 
representative fire scenarios for a typical case study building. The scenarios include a 
range of damage levels due to a “moderate” and a “design level” earthquake event.  
 
This analysis will obviously not give a comprehensive or an absolute measure of the 
increased risk to life safety due to fire following an earthquake. However it presents a 
comparison of the effect of earthquake damage on fire safety systems for some typical 





• To estimate the likely earthquake damage to fire safety systems in the case study 
building. 
• To assess the resulting fire growth and fire and smoke spread for typical design 
fires at different floors of the building. 




For the case study building, the procedure is as follows. 
• Select a typical design fire consistent with the buildings use. 
• Select three fire locations at the near the bottom, top, and mid height of the 
building. 
• Select a number of design scenarios to include combinations of potential 
damage to fire safety systems. 
• Compute the time to loss of tenability for critical locations for each scenario, 
and the available safe exit time for occupants at risk. 
• Compute the required safe egress time for each floor for each scenario. 
• Compare the available safe egress time with the required safe egress time to 
determine the number of occupants at risk. Derive the average number of 
occupants at risk for all floors for each scenario. 
• Estimate the probability of each scenario for a moderate and a design level 
earthquake, and determine the number of occupants at risk. 
 
9.5 Case study building,  
 
The case study building is an office building designed and built in the late 1980s. The 
earthquake design is comparable with current earthquake code requirements, and the 
fire safety systems provided are generally equivalent or better than current 
requirements. For the purpose of this case study, the fire safety systems are assumed 
to be those of the Acceptable Solutions  (BIA, 2000). 
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This building was selected because it is typical of the size, use, configuration and 
structural characteristics of tall office buildings likely to be constructed in New 
Zealand in the near future. Apartment and other residential buildings have 
significantly different fire safety system requirements, requiring a generally higher 
level of protection. They also have more compartmentation, and are therefore more 
complicated to analyse for fire and smoke spread. However there are few apartment 
building of comparable height in New Zealand. 
 
The case study building consists of a 20 storey tower with a three storey podium 
structure, including one level of basement. The tower is symmetrical and regular, of 
plan dimensions 36 m x 26 m. Storey height is 3.6 m at ground floor and 3.42 m 
typically. The podium is 55 m x 50 m, and is seismically separated from the tower. 
The structure is of reinforced concrete with precast concrete floors, precast concrete 
beams and cast-in-place concrete columns.  Earthquake loads are resisted by the 
reinforced concrete peripheral frames. This means that the building is relatively 
flexible compared with a building using structural shear walls as the principal 
earthquake resisting system. 
 
The tower has a centrally located service core, which includes two precast concrete 
stairs and five lifts. The walls to the core are timber framed with plasterboard linings. 
External cladding is glazed curtain wall. The main floor area is assumed to be a single 
open plan office area. The podium has additional stairs independent of the main core. 
 
A typical floor plan is shown in Figure 9.1. 
 
The initial design for the building derived a predicted first mode period of some 2.5 
seconds. Earthquake design to the New Zealand Loading Code (SNZ, 1992) specifies 
a 450 year return period earthquake (MM 8.5 approx.), for which the predicted 
maximum inter-storey deflection is calculated as 28mm. This is well within the 
allowable deflection of 51 mm specified in the Loading Code. An equivalent shear 
wall building could be expected to have a period of some 1 second and a maximum 





Figure 9.1 : Case study building : typical floor plan. 
 
 
The mechanical services in the building include; 
• Separate air-handling units on each floor, with ducted supply, and with return 
air via the ceiling plenum. 
• Fan assisted vertical supply and spill air ducts serving the air-handling units on 
all floors. 
• A separate fan-assisted toilet ventilation duct serving all floors 
• Pressurisation units to both stairs. 
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• Fire dampers fitted to ducts at all fire separations (floors) and at the top of the 
lift and stair shafts.  
• Smoke detector activation of all fire dampers. 
 
The fire safety systems assumed for the analysis (and as required by the Acceptable 
Solutions) are as follows; 
• Two safe path stairs. 
• Automatic fire sprinkler system. 
• Automatic smoke detection system with manual call points.  
• Smoke control in air handling systems. 
• Pressurisation in safe paths. 
• Fire Service control of lifts. 
• Emergency lighting in exitways. 
• Fire hydrant system. 
• Refuge areas in stairs. 
• Fire systems centre. 
• Fire rating of floors, and protected shafts (F rating) : 60 minutes. 
• Fire rating of primary structure (S rating) : 180 minutes. 
 
Note that the external walls of the tower are some 9 metres from adjacent properties 
and do not require fire resistant cladding materials. 
Smoke control is achieved by plant shutdown, and activation of stair pressurisation 
units and fire dampers (limited smoke control only) on alarm activation.  
 
The Acceptable Solution recommend a design Fire Load Energy Density (FLED) of 
800 MJ/m2 for general office use, and a design occupant density of 0.1 person/m2 of 




The building is modelled for fire growth and fire and smoke spread using the 
BRANZFIRE Version 2002.7 computer programme (BRANZ, 2002).  This is a multi-
compartment (up to 10 room) zone model that accommodates multiple vents, and 
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multiple burning objects. It aims to predict various fire characteristics in the upper and 
lower layers, including temperature, species concentration, plume and vent flows, 
layer interface height, fractional effective dose, visibility, and sprinkler/ detector 
activation. It also includes provision for mechanical ventilation, flame spread and fire 
growth models for room lining materials, and glass fracture prediction. 
 
The building is modelled with floors as separate individual compartments, and each 
stair and the lift shaft modelled as a separate full height shaft. The various 
compartments are connected with vertical and horizontal vents to adjacent 
compartments and to the outside as appropriate. Vents are calculated to include 
normal construction leakage as well as damage to separations and services, possible 
open doors, and glass breakage as appropriate to the scenario being modelled. 
 
The ceiling space in each floor is a return air plenum for the ventilation system. Each 
floor is modelled as full height, but smoke detector and sprinkler activation are 
separately modelled to reflect their location at the lower ceiling level. 
 
In order to work within the limitation of the software it is necessary to make some 
simplifying assumptions to the physical model of the building.  Preliminary modelling 
of various smoke spread mechanisms was carried out to confirm that the assumptions 
would still achieve realistic results, and an endeavour has been made to keep these 
conservative (in terms of not significantly overestimating hazard). The assumptions 
are as follows; 
• Critical locations for tenability are the stairs, the fire floor, the floor above the 
fire floor (due to inter-floor leakage), and the top floor of the building (due 
principally to smoke transfer via the lift shaft). 
• Leakage from other floors and from the lift and stair shafts may be modelled 
as if to the outside, with appropriate adjustment to leakage areas to reflect the 
restriction to the flow due to the enclosure. 
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Note :  Solid lines show extent of modelled spaces. 
Leakage paths, openings and glazing not shown. 
 
Figure 9.2 Case study building : analysis model. 
 
 
Other assumptions relevant to the modelling are as follows:.  
• The lift and stairs are modelled as single zone rooms. 
• Except where open doors are modelled, both stairs will have the same 
tenability conditions. 
• The stack effect is ignored. It is acknowledged that this may have a significant 
effect on smoke movement. However the stack effect is principally driven by 
the ambient temperature difference between internal and external spaces, and 
may encourage or suppress smoke movement into the shafts depending on the 
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location of the fire room. As this assessment is a comparison of specific 
scenarios, it is valid to ignore this effect. 
• Glass in the external walls to the fire floor will progressively fall out between 
the programme predicted fracture time and flashover. 
• Fire dampers have fail-safe closure mechanisms, but allow a 2% smoke 
penetration in fire mode. 
 
Basic calculations for the modelling input, and a typical input printout are presented 
in Appendix E. 
 
9.7 Design Fires. 
 
The initial design fire is a two-panel computer workstation taken from the NIST fire 
test records. This has a growth rate between fast and medium to a peak Heat Release 
Rate of 1800 kW after 280 secs. as shown in Figure 9.3. This design fire is used 
where sprinklers are operational, as noted below. 
 
Figure 9.3 : NIST workstation fire. 
 
 
For uncontrolled fires (when sprinklers do not operate), fire spread throughout the 
compartment is modelled using the FREEBURN subroutine from the FPETOOL 
software (Deal, 1994). Similar workstations were assumed at approx 3 metre centres  
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and the rate of fire spread due to radiation was modelled, assuming the initial burning 
object was adjacent to the centre of an exterior wall. The resulting composite fire was 
found to closely match a t2   fire growth curve of fire intensity coefficient   ∝ = .019, as  
shown in Figure 9.4. This fire is used to model the uncontrolled fire up to flashover, 
when the full FLED of 800 MJ/m2 becomes involved. 
 
Figure 9.4 : Combined design fire 
 
 
The FREEBURN analysis indicated that ignition of the nearest adjacent workstations 
occurred at approximately the same time as predicted sprinkler activation. It was 
therefore considered reasonable to limit the sprinkler controlled fire load to burnout of 
























































Design Fire T  .019
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Figure 9.5 :  Design scenario event tree 
 
 
9.8 Design scenarios 
 




The “open doors” scenario assumes the door to one stair and one elevator door are 
open on the fire floor only. For the elevator door, it is assumed that the lift car is 
located at the fire floor.  
 
The “moderate barrier damage” scenario reflects limited joint cracking and some 
loosening of fixings in the framed walls, allowing limited smoke penetration. The 
“major barrier damage” scenario assumes separation of the lining from the framing at 
the joints, and also assumes the failure of 33% of the external glazing at each floor. 
The figure of 33% is considered a realistic minimum. Generally the increased early 
ventilation will increase the time to loss of tenability. 
 
It should be noted that this structure is relatively flexible, because earthquake loads 
are resisted by frame action. The timber framed stair and lift enclosures will therefore 
be subject to significant damage before any cracking is likely occur in the floor slabs.  
 
This section of the analysis assumes that the fire has developed to a sufficient size to 
activate the sprinkler system. The likelihood of Fire Service intervention at this stage 
in a seismic event is considered unlikely, and has been ignored. Even where vehicular 
access is possibly, it is unlikely that the Fire Service will have the capability or 




9.9 Tenability considerations 
 
The BRANZFIRE model calculates and reports a number of critical tenability criteria 
including FED radiation, FED narcotic gasses, smoke obscuration, and convective 
heat, all at a specified monitoring height. Tenability is typically assessed at a 
reference height of 2 metres (Buchanan, 2001a). The critical design criteria for this 
case study are found to be upper layer convective heat (60oC max) and smoke 
obscuration on the fire floor, and upper layer smoke obscuration on other floors. The 
critical value for smoke obscuration is taken as 10 metre visibility (Buchanan, 2001a), 
which is equivalent to an Optical Density of 0.13.   
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For the stairs, which were modelled as single zones, smoke obscuration was again the 
critical criteria, and the same limiting values were adopted.  The single zone model 
may underestimate the smoke spread from the shafts at the upper levels, but is 
probably conservative for tenability in the shaft as a whole.  
 
Bryan (1995) reported on a British study where 64% of the subjects continued to 
move through smoke with a visibility of only 4 metres. However walking speeds will 
be significantly reduced at this visibility (Klote and Milke, 1992), and people are 
likely to be more cautious on stairs than on level routes. It s also noted that the smoke 
obscuration values from BRANZFIRE are for free burning situations, and higher soot 
yields will occur after flashover. The value of 10 metre visibility is therefore 
considered a reasonable design criteria. 
 
When considering the tenability of stairs, the following assumptions have been made. 
• Emergency lighting will continue to operate. 
• Where they have a choice, occupants will always avoid a stair with reduced 
visibility. 
• Where barriers are not damaged, smoke will only enter the stair when the 
upper layer lowers to the door head level. 
• The stairs below the fire floor will remain tenable at all times. 
• Pressurised stairs will prevent leakage around the doors and open door flow 
for the controlled fire only (this should represent the usual design case for the 
system).  Leakage will occur for the uncontrolled fire. 
 
 
9.10 Modelling results 
 
A number of BRANZFIRE simulations were run at three different levels in the 
building. Table 9.1 shows representative results from all simulations. Simulations 





Glass Fracture :    9.7 mins (180o C approx.) 
Flashover (uncontrolled fire);  19.3 to 20 mins. 
Sprinkler activation;    4.8 mins. 





Sprinkler controlled fire 
scenarios 















 Time to untenability (mins) Time to untenability (mins) 
Fire Floor 6.2 6.3 6.4 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.7 
Floor 
Above 
* * * 29.5 * 24.5 * 
Top Floor * * 17.1 21.7 26.5 21.5 9.9 
   
 Time to OD at 0.13 m-1 (mins) Time to OD  at 0.13 m-1 (mins) 
Stair with 
open doora 




40 33.6 11.0 22.2 24.3 10.0 8.5 
 
*  indicates no loss of tenability at 50 minutes. 
a   the open/closed door is located on the fire floor. 
 
Table 9.1  : Untenability times from case study modelling. 
 
 
It can be seen that: 
• The untenability time of the fire room is longer for the controlled fire, but 
otherwise shows little variation between scenarios. The fire is not ventilation 
controlled at loss of tenability, and the smoke layer has lowered 2.2 metres to 
before sprinkler activation. 
• For other floors, the available egress time is determined by the untenability 
time of the escape stairs. The untenability time is shorter for an open door to 
the stair, and decreases with increasing damage to the stair walls.  
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• The top floor untenability time is a function of smoke movement through the 
shafts. The untenability time decreases with open doors and/or increasing 
damage to the shaft walls.  
• The floor immediately above the fire floor is not critical. Untenability times 
again depended on smoke movement from the shafts. 
 
The model output is used to estimate tenability times for other scenarios not 
specifically modelled. For instance the stair tenability for both stair doors open is 
assumed to be the same as the  “open stair” in modelled case, and the tenability times 
for other stair locations was interpolated from the three locations modelled. 
 
The BRANZFIRE model also measures the Equivalent Fire Resistance Rating within 
the fire enclosure, in accordance with the cumulative radiant energy method (Nyman, 
2002). This allows a comparison of the actual fire exposure with the standard tests 
(ISO 834 and equivalent) used in the NZ Building Code. For the case study building, 
the equivalent thermal exposure time measured by model was in all cases less than the 
actual time after ignition. This is a reflection of the moderate fire growth. 
 
9.11 Earthquake scenarios and damage probability 
 
It is evident from previous seismic events that earthquakes of a lesser magnitude than 
the “design” earthquake can cause significant damage in new buildings.  The term 
“moderate” earthquake has been used for earthquakes in the range upper MMVII to 
lower MMVIII  (MM 8.0), (Brunsdon and Clark, 2000). These events are more 
frequent than the “design’ event, and, as observed at Northridge and Loma Prieta, 
they can cause significant failure of fire safety systems.  
 
The moderate earthquake event has also been used for lifeline vulnerability 
assessment (Christchurch Lifelines Group, 1997) as it represents a seismic intensity 
for which urban water supply, power supply and communications systems have been 
seen to demonstrate a significant probability of failure. 
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It should be noted that there is some disagreement on an appropriate seismic hazard 
model for some seismically active areas in New Zealand, and the return periods, peak 
ground acceleration and felt intensities given in Table 9.2 must therefore be taken as 
indicative only. 
 
For this study the probability of each of the damage scenarios presented in Table 9.1 
above is to be assessed for a “moderate’ earthquake (150 year return period) and a 
“design” earthquake (450 year return period) to obtain an overall comparative risk 
index. The expected damage ratios are listed in Table 9.2, and their derivation is 
discussed below. 
 
Damage probability Earthquake 
 None Moderate Design 
Earthquake return period NA 150 450 
Approx. intensity NA MM8 MM8.5 
Approx. peak ground acceleration NA 0.25g 0.37g 
Max. inter-storey deflection    NA 15mm 28mm 
Probability of open door at fire 
floor 
0.05 0.05 0.1 
Probability of pressurisation system 
operating.  
0.97 0.3 0.1 
Probability of sprinkler control 0.99 0.1 0.01 
Probability of mod. barrier damage 0.05 0.7 0.25 
Probability of major barrier damage 0 0.1 0.7 
 
Table 9.2 :   Earthquake damage probability 
 
The values quoted have been assessed using engineering judgement based on the 
material given in section 8 of this report. They are as follows. 
• Probability of open door  – Australian Fire Engineering Guidelines 
(FCRCL,1996), (refer this report section 8.5). The increased probability at the 
major damage stage is to reflect that deformation of the walls may prevent 
doors closing completely. 
• Probability of pressurisation system operating (this report section 8.4) -  An 
initial reliability of 0.97 is based on data from Klote and Milke (1992). The 
reduced post earthquake figures are based on the probability of the electric 
power supply failure using data from Feeney (2001) and by inference from 
Christchurch Lifelines Group (1997) for the moderate earthquake. Note that 
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these figures do not include the effect of barrier damage, which is considered 
separately. 
• Probability of sprinkler control (this report section 8.2 and 8.3) – A pre-
earthquake reliability of 0.99 is taken from FCRCL (1996). Post earthquake 
probability is primarily determined by the reliability of the external water and 
electricity supplies. This report has assumed an installation to the minimum 
requirements of the Acceptable Solution (BIA, 2000). This is a single town 
main supply with electric booster pump. Feeney (2001) assesses the 
probability of failure in a design earthquake as 0.99. This figure includes 
consideration of sprinkler pipework integrity as well as water and power 
supply vulnerability assessed for a New Zealand urban area. The probability of 
failure of 0.90 for a “moderate” earthquake reflects the high vulnerability of 
the water and power supplies as identified in New Zealand reports (Brunsdon 
and Clark, 2000, and Christchurch Lifelines Group, 1997). 
• Probability of barrier damage (this report section 8.5) –  Pre-earthquake 
probability of failure from FCRCL (1996). Post-earthquake values are inferred 
from date by Porter et al (2001), Sekizawa et al.(2000) and the NZ Loading 
Code (SNZ, 1992). It is noted that the deflection expected at “moderate” 
earthquake level (15 mm) is well in excess of the recommended deflections (8 
to 13 mm) from the above references for loss of serviceability due to cracking. 
However the deflection at “design” earthquake level exactly matches Porter et 
al figure of 28 mm for “significant” damage. 
 
From Table 9.2 and its derivation it can be seen that; 
• The barriers are subject to significant loss of integrity in a moderate 
earthquake. The extent of barrier damage is primarily a function of the inter-
storey earthquake deflection, which varies with the storey height above 
ground. The deflection used here is the maximum deflection and is 
representative of the lower few floors.  This value is considered appropriate, as 
these floors are the high-risk fire locations for loss of tenability in the stairs. 
• The post-earthquake performance of the sprinkler and pressurisations systems 
is dominated by the vulnerability of the external water and/or power supplies. 
This is independent of the floor location.  
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Emergency lighting as required by the Acceptable Solutions consists of robust, 
independent battery powered units, and is considered to remain operational during 
evacuation. It is acknowledged that effective lighting is critical for effective 
evacuation. 
 
Earthquakes of greater intensity than the design earthquake are of course possible, but 
with decreasing probability of occurrence. A significant concern with larger 
earthquakes is the potential damage to the stairs, possibly trapping occupants in the 
building. This consideration is outside the scope of this project, but highlights the 
importance of adequate design and detailing of stairs to ensure that they survive at 
least the design earthquake. 
 
9.12 Required safe egress time.  
 
The required time to evacuate the building in a typical fire emergency situation has 
been assessed using the method of Nelson and MacLennan (1995). The speed of 
evacuation is generally controlled by the capacity of the stair. Calculations are 
included in Appendix F.  Table 9.3 is a summary of the calculation results. 
  
Location Time of travel  
 1 stair available 2 stairs available 
Max. travel time to stair entry 3.7 min 3.4 min 
Exit flow in stairs 47.9 person/min 95.8 person/min. 
Time to travel one flight 0.31 min 0.31 min 
Time to evacuate floor (ignoring 
queuing) 
1.67 min 0.84  min 
Time from lowest stair to final exit 0.5 min 0.5 min 
Total time to evacuate building 35.9 min 19.9 min 
 
Table 9.3 :    Required safe egress time summary. 
 
There are a number of issues that differentiate post-earthquake design scenarios from 
those envisaged in the typical fire evacuation situation. These include; 
• Damage to alarm systems may delay cues and initiation of action. 
• The duration of earthquake shaking will vary. Earthquake shaking from a 
major fault may exceed one minute duration, and it is unlikely that any 
occupant response will be possible during this time.  
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• Damage to ceilings, stairs, doors and partitions may reduce travel speeds. 
• Normal evacuation management may fail due to communication system 
damage, leading to possible congestion and queuing at vulnerable locations. 
However it is assumed for this analysis that occupants will endeavour to leave the 
building as soon as possible after shaking ceases. The adopted pre-movement time of 
3 minutes is based on 2 minutes for earthquake duration and 1 minute for occupant 
decision and investigation time.   
 
The total evacuation time is dictated by the capacity of the stairs, and queuing is likely 
to occur at the entry points to the stair on each floor. In the absence of an operational 
management system, the time to evacuate any given floor will be heavily dependent 
on the hierarchy of use of the stair. For this analysis it is assumed that persons already 
in the stair will take dominance over those waiting at other floors. This will mean that, 
once the stairs are full, the building will empty progressively from the top floor down.  
 
The obvious exception to this must be the fire floor, unless this is situated in the top 
few levels. However it seems reasonable to assume that the occupants of this level 
will have an earlier awareness and an increased motivation of self preservation the 
will enable them to enter the stair before conditions on the floor become untenable. 
 
9.13 Number of occupants at risk. 
 
The tenability times determined in 9.11 and the required safe egress times from 9.12 
above are compared to determine the number of persons at risk for a fire on each floor 
for each scenario.  
 
Consideration of the tenability times shows that, if evacuation of the fire floor takes 
some precedence over other floors, the safe escape from the building is determined by 
the tenability of the stairs. The procedure for determining the occupants at risk is 
therefore as follows.  
For a given floor and scenario, determine; 
• The number of occupants on the fire floor and all floors above. 
• The time to loss of tenability of the stair/stairs at the fire floor. 
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• The number of occupants in the upper floors that cannot evacuate to below the 
fire floor in this time. 
• The average number of occupants for all floors for each scenario. 
The calculation basis and spreadsheet printout are given in Appendix G of this report.  
 
For each selected earthquake, the damage probabilities detailed in Table 9.2 above are 
then applied to each scenario to determine an average number of persons at risk for 
that earthquake. The results are shown in the top line of Table 9.4. 
 
To consider possible means of reducing the risk, additional computations were carried 
out with enhanced systems as follows. 
• Sprinkler reliability of 80%, as recommended by Robertson and Mehaffey, 
(2000). 
• Barrier reliability of 90%, assumed achievable with proper seismic joint 
detailing (FCRCL, 1996). 
Results are shown in lines 2 and 3 of Table 9.4. 
 
A typical spreadsheet calculation printout is included in Appendix H of this report. 
 







Design to Acceptable Solutions 0.2 216 335 
Enhanced sprinkler reliability (80%) NA 66 195 
Enhanced barrier integrity (90%) NA 30 38 
 
Table 9. 4 :   Number of occupants at risk 
 
For each earthquake case, the number of occupants shown in Table 9.4 is the number 
of persons unable to evacuate to below the fire floor before the stairs become 
untenable, based on the average for a fire on any floor of the building. The Table 
shows that; 
• For a total building occupancy of 1600 persons, the number at risk is 
significant in both scenarios considered. 
• The risk of loss of life may be significantly reduced by improved post-
earthquake reliability of the sprinkler and stair enclosures. 
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9.14 Absolute risk 
 
This analysis has used a simplified fire spread model and single design fire. While this 
should give a reasonable comparison of performance for the various scenarios, it 
cannot be considered as sufficiently rigorous and comprehensive to give an 
authoritative measure of risk in absolute terms. However, as our scenarios are based 
on realistic assumptions and likely events, it may be instructive to consider our results 
against current opinion on quantifying acceptable risk. 
 
Using our results, an approximate absolute risk can be calculated using assumed 
figures for the probability of “serious ignition” (ignitions that cannot be suppressed by 
building occupants) from Scawthorn (1995). Results are shown in Table 9.5. 
 
 Mod. earthquake Design earthquake 
Annual probability of earthquake      (P1) 0.0067 0.0020 
Probability of “serious ignition”       ( P2) 0.027 0.037 
Probability building is occupied        (P3) 0.24 0.24 
Combined probability    P’ = (P1xP2xP3) 4.34 x10-5 1.78 x10-5 
Number of occupants at risk               (N)   216 335 
Probability of loss of life per  
Person per year.                          (P’/N)      
2.0 x10-7 5.3 x10-8 
 
Table 9.5 :   Absolute risk. 
 
Porter and Scawthorn (1998) list a number of recommended values for “tolerable” 
risk for loss of life. 
These include;  
• US Government agencies, for general environmental hazards ; 1 in 1,000,000 
chance of untimely death in a lifetime (1.4 x10-8  per person per year  for 70 
year expected life). 
• FEMA (US). 2. 8 x10-7 per person per year due to earthquake induced collapse 
in an engineered building. 
 
Other authorities include the severity of the event (expressed as the number of 
fatalities) as one of the determining criteria for acceptable probability. These include; 
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• UK draft fire safety code DD240 (BSI, 1997), which suggests 5 x10-8 per 
person per year for multiple deaths (greater than 100 persons at risk). 
• Helm (1996) provides a graphical relationship (Figure 9.6) for tolerable risk 
due to natural and technological disasters. Results from Table 9.5 are plotted 
on Helm’s chart in Figure 9.6. 
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As this analysis includes a comparison of different scenarios it is appropriate to 
compare results with an authority that includes the event severity.  Both our scenarios 
exceed the recommended UK draft recommendations. On the Helm chart, the results 
fall within the region where the risk is tolerable only if the cost of risk reduction 
would exceed the improvement gained. The moderate earthquake plot in particular is 
close to the region identified as “tolerable” only if risk reduction is impracticable or 






















Table 9.5 indicates that; 
• The moderate earthquake presents a greater risk of loss of life due to its 
greater frequency. 
• Both scenarios pose a significant risk of loss of life, and would be 
unacceptable to most authorities without detailed justification that further risk 
reduction is economically impracticable. Note that any meaningful cost/benefit 
analysis will need to be building specific to properly assess the cost and 




The following conclusions can be drawn for the case study building for the scenario 
of fire following an earthquake. 
• Occupants are exposed to a significant risk of loss of life, which would require 
cost/benefit justification for acceptance by most authorities reviewed above. 
• The moderate earthquake presents a greater annual risk of loss of life due to its 
more frequent occurrence. 
• Integrity of stair enclosures is the most significant factor in ensuring adequate 
available evacuation time. Although the deflections of the building comply 
with code limitations for both ultimate and serviceability limit states, the 
seismic degradation of the enclosures is considerable.  
• Sprinkler control may not maintain tenability in the stairs in the event of 
enclosure damage. 
• Stair pressurisation is not effective once enclosures are damaged.  
 
These conclusions are assessed from a model that includes the specific structural 
characteristics, size, layout, fire load, mechanical system and ventilation of the case 
study building. They will not necessarily apply to other building. In addition there are 
features that were considered adequate in this building that may be of major 
importance in other situations, and should generally be included in the risk 
assessment. These are: 
• Effective emergency lighting in the stairs. 
• Effective smoke control in air handling systems. 
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• Adequate fire resistance of stair enclosures for “real’ fire exposure. 
 
Our analysis indicates that the “moderate” earthquake presents the larger annual risk 
to loss of life, due to its more frequent occurrence. However it should be noted that 
larger earthquakes would result in increasing damage to fittings, fixtures and 











Earthquakes in seismically active areas can significantly reduce the reliability of fire 
safety systems in buildings, and significantly increase the risk of loss of life if a fire 
occurs within the building. 
 
The case study in this report, based on the New Zealand Acceptable Solutions, has 
demonstrated that the increased risk is at a level where it would be acceptable to most 
authorities only if risk reduction was impracticable or grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained. 
 
10.2 Design philosophy 
 
The philosophy of performance- based design is to enable each building to be 
individually designed to achieve a safe and economic solution to meet the specified 
performance objectives. Logically this requires the performance of the building to be 
assessed for all realistic design scenarios to enable the overall performance to be 
measured against the stated objectives of the code. Even though the code objectives 
may not be specifically quantified, it is appropriate that less likely events should be 
included in the assessment, to enable a comparison of performance level with other 
more common events. Post- earthquake fire is a low probability event but with high 
potential consequences, and it is appropriate that it be included in the risk analysis. 
 
If prescriptive solutions are to be included as a means of compliance, the integrity of 
the philosophy requires that they have a sound technical basis consistent with the 
performance requirements of the code. This is particularly relevant where the 





10.3 Principal performance concerns. 
 
Consideration of past earthquakes and ongoing research in several countries has 
identified three major factors contributing to the high level of risk in post-earthquake 
fire. These are  
• A high probability of failure of many fire safety systems, due to often 
inadequate design requirements, design implementation and detailing, and 
inspection and testing regimes. (Note that in this context fire safety systems 
include all methods used to warn people of an emergency, provide safe 
evacuation, and restrict the spread of fire, and includes both active and passive 
protection.)  
• A high level of dependence on vulnerable external services (electricity and 
water supply).  
• The non-availability of external intervention by Fire Service personnel to 
assist evacuation and control fire spread. 
 
10.4 Performance code trends 
 
Most countries with performance- based codes are moving toward developing a 
probabilistic risk analysis model for design. This enables the earthquake vulnerability 
of systems to be specifically assessed for each individual situation. 
 
Where a prescriptive design option is to be included, some provision needs to be made 
to include the implications of earthquake damage. Options being considered in some 
countries for a partial prescriptive design solution include; 
• Designing the post-earthquake building for a reduced heat release fire, with 
the design fire size increased as the system reliability decreased.   
• Designing the building for a normal design fire but assuming that one or more 






10.5 The New Zealand Building Code provisions 
 
The New Zealand Building Code provisions for fire do not provide any quantified 
performance objectives, so the prescriptive Acceptable Solutions have become the 
principal criteria for assessment of alternative designs. Unfortunately no technical 
basis is given for many of the provisions, so the specific area of concern initiating a 
requirement is not always apparent. There are also a number of apparent 
inconsistencies, and technical justification has not been made available for a number 
of recent amendments. The document therefore lacks the technical foundation and the 
transparency to enable it to be used confidently and effectively as a measure of 
performance.  
 
The Acceptable Solution for fire has no specific mention of post-earthquake fire. 
Design of fire safety system for earthquake loads is included in other section of the 
building code, and the Acceptable Solution appears to assume that the design to these 
provisions will ensure adequate safety.  
 
However recent research in New Zealand and consideration of overseas research and 
earthquake observation indicates that current design recommendations of the 
approved documents are inadequate.   
Of particular concern in the New Zealand context are; 
• The lack of any methodology to allow for the vulnerability of public utilities, 
especially electric power and water.  
• The lack of adequate and consistent design standards and coordination 
procedures to ensure that system design and installation is consistent with the 
overall building performance 
• The lack of provisions in the Approved Documents to limit damage to passive 
fire protection due to building deflections in an earthquake. 
• The low reliability of mechanical smoke control, particularly in sophisticated, 
multi-element systems. 
 
In relation to the vulnerability of water supply, it is of concern that a single mains 
water supply with electric pumps to boost to operating pressure appears to be 
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acceptable to satisfy the Acceptable Solution. For seismically active areas this 
represents a significant reduction on the requirements of the Sprinkler Code NZS 
4541:1996  (SNZ, 1996), which requires independent dual supplies. 
 
10.6 Case study 
 
The case study in this report considered a 20 storey concrete framed office building 
designed to the Acceptable Solutions. The risk assessment found that there was a 
significant risk of loss of life in both moderate and design earthquake events. The 
principal contributors were the vulnerability of the public water supply to the 
sprinkler system, and the loss of integrity of the stair enclosures permitting smoke 
spread into the stairs. 
 
 
10.7 Other concerns. 
 
Post Earthquake Occupations of buildings 
There is a significant risk of loss of life in any building re-occupied before the fire 
safety systems have been checked for performance after the earthquake. Unseen 
damage to fire separations may allow fire and smoke spread, and any failure of 
detection or suppression systems will reduce available escape times. 
 
Retrofitting of old buildings.  
The case study in this report has assumed a modern building with currently acceptable 
earthquake performance. In the retrofitting of older buildings, there is likely to be an 
increased risk due to higher potential damage to systems and building elements. This 
may result in less reliable safety systems and more obstruction and delays to persons 
evacuating the building.  
 
In addition, the New Zealand Building Code requires the retrofitted systems to 
achieve compliance to a level as nearly as is reasonably practicable to that required 
for a new building. The level of reasonableness assumes a degree of cost/benefit 
consideration, but in most cases the decision will be subjective. The end result in most 
cases will be a reduced level of performance to that expected for a new building. 
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Fire Resistance Ratings. 
The F ratings in the Acceptable Solution are based on ensuring that fire separations 
maintain an appropriate level of protection for sufficient time for occupants to escape. 
However the requirements are based on fire resistance determined in standard fire 
tests, which may overestimate the survival time of the separation in a realistic fire.  In 
addition any damage or dislocation to building fittings and ceilings may obstruct 
means of escape and increase the required time for safe evacuation. 
 
Defend in Place options. 
Defend in place options are accepted as an appropriate means of protecting occupants 
in specific types of buildings, especially tall residential buildings and buildings where 
people’s mobility is impaired or restricted. It is evident that the fire separation in these 
cases must be designed to resist a design earthquake without loss of integrity and to 
resist the fire exposure due complete burnout of the fire compartment without 
suppression systems or outside intervention. Also a high reliability is required of any 
air handling systems that are could allow fire or smoke spread.  
 
If adequate means of escape is not available in these situations, it is critical that 
building occupants are fully trained and aware of the importance of the necessary 
procedures in a fire emergency. Voice communication systems should not be relied 










It is anticipated that there will be development towards full probabilistic design 
methodologies for the New Zealand Building Code in the future.  This will allow 
post-earthquake reliability of fire safety systems to be specifically considered in the 
analysis, However it is likely that that there will continue to be a prescriptive design 
option in the New Zealand Building Code and the following recommendations include 
for this assumption. 
 
The recommendations are based on the information contained in this report. They are 
intended to reduce the risk in post-earthquake fire, and to improve the technical status 
of the Acceptable Solution for fire.  They include; 
• Amending the Building Code Approved Documents to identify post-
earthquake fire as a design scenario in seismic areas, and to require 
consideration of post-earthquake system reliability. 
• Improving the post-earthquake reliability of active and passive fire safety 
systems. 
•  Improving and validating the technical basis of the Acceptable Solution for 
fire. 
• Incorporating inspection of fire safety systems as part of the post-earthquake 
safety assessment of damaged buildings. 
 
 
11.2 Building Code requirements. 
 
Assessment of fire designs against the performance requirements of the Building 
Code will continue to be subjective and open to individual interpretation until 
performance requirements are quantified. Without quantified performance objectives 
it is also be extremely difficult to carry out cost/benefit analyses to justify 
amendments to the code and/ or Approved Documents.  The following 
recommendations are intended to address this issue. 
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It is recommended that; 
• Quantified performance requirements be developed for the Building Code fire 
safety clauses. 
• The Building Code be amended to specify an appropriate earthquake design 
level for fire safety systems. It accordance with Building Act provisions, a 
cost/benefit analysis would be desirable to determination of an appropriate 
earthquake level. 
 
11.3 Approved Documents. 
 
It is recommended that; 
• Priority be given to completion of current amendments to New Zealand 
Standards NZS4203, NZS4219 and NZS4541, to ensuring that the amended 
documents are compatible, and that their provisions will achieve a 
performance appropriate for life safety systems.  
• The New Zealand Building Code Acceptable Solutions be amended to provide 
an appropriate level of redundancy in fire design to allow for vulnerability of 
building fire safety systems and public utilities. A cost/benefit analysis is 
recommended to determine appropriate redundancy factors. 
• Sprinkler protected buildings be required to have two independent water 
supplies, to compensate for the known earthquake vulnerability of the utility 
systems. Mandatory on-site water storage and emergency power supply could 
be considered as an economic option. 
• The current F rating requirements in the Acceptable Solutions be reviewed to 
incorporate consideration of real fire performance and seismic vulnerability of 
sprinkler systems, as well as potential delays in post-earthquake evacuation 
due to building damage. 
• All future amendments to the Acceptable Solutions include a quantified 
technical and/or cost benefit justification. This would increase practitioner 
confidence in the document. It would also clarify the performance issues 
addressed by the amendments and allow for better-informed and more 




11.4 Implementation issues. 
 
It is recommended that; 
• Post-earthquake reconnaissance teams for building safety should include fire 
safety professionals. The inspection should include examination and testing as 
appropriate of all fire safety systems, both active and passive, and 
consideration of potential ignition sources due to damaged systems, services 
and equipment. 
• Territorial authorities should ensure that mechanical systems required for life 
safety are adequately designed and detailed by appropriately qualified 
professionals using the earthquake response parameters specific to the 
individual building and system location. This will require detailed input from 
the structural design consultant. 
• Territorial authorities should ensure that the inspection, testing and reporting 
procedures, especially for sophisticated fire safety systems, are regularly 
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Buildings Type I (Masonry D in the NZ 1965MM scale) 
 
Buildings with low standard of workmanship, poor mortar, 
or constructed of weak materials like mud brick or 
rammed earth. Soft storey structures (e.g. shops) made of 
masonry, weak reinforced concrete, or composite materials 
(e.g. some walls timber, some brick) not well tied together. 
Masonry buildings otherwise conforming to Buildings 
Types I - III, but also having heavy unreinforced masonry 
towers. (Buildings constructed entirely of timber must be 
of extremely low quality to be Type I). 
 
Buildings Type II (Mason,y C in the lIZ 1966MM scale) 
 
Buildings of ordinary workmanship, with mortar of 
average quality. No extreme weakness, such as inadequate 
bonding of the corners, but neither designed nor reinforced 
to resist lateral forces. Such buildings not having heavy 
unreinforced masonry towers. 
 
Buildings Type III (Masonry B in the NZ 1966MM scale) 
 
Reinforced masonry or concrete buildings of good 
workmanship and with sound mortar, but not formally 
designed to resist earthquake forces. 
Structures Type IV (Masonry A in the lIZ 1966MM scale) 
 
Buildings and bridges designed and built to resist 
earthquakes to normal use standards, i.e. no special 
collapse or damage limiting measures taken (mid-1930’s 
to c.1970 for concrete and to c. 1980 for other materials). 
 
Structures Type V 
 
Buildings and bridges, designed and built to normal use 
standards, i.e. no special damage limiting measures taken, 
other than code requirements, dating from since c. 1970 
for concrete and c. 1980 for other materials. 
 
Structures Type VI 
 
Structures, dating from c. 1980, with well-defined 
foundation behaviour, which have been specially designed 
for minimal damage, e.g. seismically isolated emergency 
facilities, some structures with dangerous or high contents, 
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Appendix D : New Zealand Building Code:  
Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 : fire safety precautions 
 
Acceptible Solution C/AS1 PART4: REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRECELLS 
 
Table 4.1: Fire Safety precautions 
  Key to table references 
  Part 2 Paragraph 2.4.2 
  Part 3 Paragraphs 3.1.5, 3.13.1 and 3.19.2 
  Part 4 Paragraphs 4.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.7, 4.5.9, 4.5.10, 4.5.13,  
     4.5.14, 4.5.15, 4.5.19 
  Part 5 Paragraphs 5.5.1, 5.6.5, 5.6.7, 5.9.4(c) 
  Part 6 Paragraphs 6.2.1, 6.4.1, 6.7.1, 6.8.1, 6.8.5, 6.8.6, 6.10.1, 6.11.1, 6.15.1, 6.19.9,  
     6.21.1, 6.23.1 (d), 6.23.2, 6.23.3 
  Part 8 Paragraphs 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3 
  Appendix A Paragraphs A1.1.1 and A1.1.2 
 
Fire safety precautions Special applications 
Type  Description a  Not required where: 
 
1 No Type 1 currently specified. 
2  Manual fire alarm system. 
3 Automatic fire alarm system with heat 
detectors and manual call points. 
4 Automatic fire alarm system with smoke 
detectors and manual call points. 
5 Automatic fire alarm system with modified 
smoke/heat detection and manual call points. 
6 Automatic fire sprinkler system with manual 
call points. 
7 Automatic fire sprinkler system with smoke 
detectors and manual call points. 
8 Voice communication system. 
9 Smoke control in air handling system. 
10 Natural smoke venting. 
11 Mechanical smoke extract. 
12 No Type 12 currently specified. 
13 Pressurisation of safe paths. 
14 Fire hose reels. 
15 Fire Service lift control. 
16 Emergency lighting in exitways. 
17 Emergency electrical power supply. 
18 Fire hydrant system. 
19 Refuge areas. 
20 Fire systems centre. 
  
 i) the escape routes serve an occupant load 
of no more than 50 in purpose groups CS, 
CM, WL, WM, WH and WF, or 
 
 ii)  the escape routes are for purpose group SA 
and serve no more than 10 beds, (or 20 
beds for trampers huts, see Paragraph 
6.20.6), or 
 
 iii)  exit doors from purpose group SA and SR 
firecells open directly onto a safe place or 
an external safepath (see Paragraph 3.14). 
 
b  Where only a single escape route is available, no 
less than a Type 4 alarm is required. See 
Paragraph 3.15.3 for situations where sprinklers 
are required. 
 
c Required where Fire Service hose run distance, 
from the Fire Service vehicular access (see 
Paragraph 8.1.1) to any point on any floor, is 
greater than 75 m. 
 
d  Emergency lighting extended to open paths 
throughout the firecell. 
 
e  Type 5 is permitted as an alternative alarm 
system within firecells containing sleeping 
accommodation. (See Appendix A for description 
of Type 5.) 
 
f  A direct connection to the Fire Service is not 
required provided a telephone is installed and 
freely available at all times to enable “111” calls 
to be made. 
Note: 
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PART4: REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRECELLS  Acceptible Solution C/AS1    
 
Table 4.1/1:  Fire safety precautions for active 




Purpose Group 0m 
(or single 
floor) 




<10 m (or  
3 floors) 
10 m 
to <25 m 
25 m  
to <34 m 
34 m  
to <46 m 
46 m 
to <58 m 
Over  
58 m 
F0 F30 F30 F45 F30 F30 F30 F60 
2af 2af 3b 4 6 7 7 7 
18c 18c 9 9 9 9 9 9 
  16 16 13 13 13 13 
  18c 18 15 15 15 15 
    16 16 16 16 
    18 18 18 17 
       18 
CS 
       19 
F0 F30 F30 F45 F30 F30 F30 F60 
2af 2af 3b 3b 6 7 7 7 
18c 18c 9 9 9 9 9 9 
  16 15 13 13 13 13 
  18c 16 15 15 15 15 
   18 16 16 16 16 
    18 18 18 17 
     20 20 18 
       19 
CM 
(Note 5) 
       20 






































F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
WF 


















Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Notes: 
1. Use of Table: Refer to Paragraph 4.4 for instructions on using this table to determine the fire safety precautions in firecells. 
2.  Adjoining firecells having a FO rating: Paragraph 6.2.1 requires adjoining firecells to be separated by fire separations with FRR no 
less than 15/1 5/1 5. 
3.  Intermediate Floors: Where a firecell contains intermediate floors a 15/15/15 FRR shall apply to the intermediate floors and 
supporting elements, and smoke control systems Type 9 and either Type 10 or Type 11, are required (see Paragraphs 4.5.16 to 
4.5.18, 6.14.3 and 6.21.5 to 6.22.14). 
4.  Car Parking: Refer to Paragraphs 6.10.3 to 6.10.6 for car parking provisions within buildings. 
5.  Sprinklers: Refer to Paragraph 5.6.l2forsprinkler requirements in FHC4 firecells where the escape height is two floors or higher. 
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Acceptible Solution C/AS1 PART4: REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRECELLS 
 
Table 4.1/2:  Fire safety precautions for active 
purpose group firecells 
Occupant load 
101 to 500 
Escape height 
Purpose Group 0m 
(or single 
floor) 




<10 m (or  
3 floors) 
10 m 
to <25 m 
25 m  
to <34 m 
34 m  
to <46 m 
46 m 
to <58 m 
Over  
58 m 
F0 F30 F30 F45 F30 F30 F30 F60 
3f 3f 3b 4 6 7 7 7 
16 16 9 9 9 9 9 9 
18c 18c 16 16 13 13 13 13 
  18c 18 15 15 15 15 
    16 16 16 16 
    18 18 18 17 
       18 
       19 
CL 
(Notes 6,7) 
       20 
F0 F30 F30 F45 F30 F30 F30 F60 
3f 3f 3b 3b 6 7 7 7 
16 16 9 9 9 9 9 9 
18c 18c 16 15 13 13 13 13 
  18c 16 15 15 15 15 
   18 16 16 16 16 
    18 18 18 17 
     20 20 18 
       19 
CM 
(Note 5) 
       20 
















































































Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Notes: 
1. Use of Table: Refer to Paragraph 4.4 for instructions on using this table to determine the fire safety precautions in firecells. 
2. Adjoining firecells having a FO rating: Paragraph 6.2.1 requires adjoining firecells to be separated by fire separations with FRR 
no less than 15/1 5/1 5. 
3. Intermediate Floors: Where a firecell contains intermediate floors a 15/15/15 FRR shall apply to the intermediate floors and 
supporting elements, and smoke control systems Type 9 and either Type 10 or Type 11, are required (see Paragraphs 4.5.16 to 
4.5.18, 6.14.3 and 6.21.5 to 6.22.14). 
4. Car Parking: Refer to Paragraphs 6.10.3 to 6.10.6 for car parking provisions within buildings. 
5. Sprinklers: Refer to Paragraph 5.6.l2forsprinkler requirements in FHC4 firecells where the escape height is two floors or higher. 
6. CL cinemas and theatres: Type 16d is required for all escape heights. 
7. CL: For firecells, which are not cinemas or theatres, with escape height less than 4.0 m and occupant load not greater than 250, 
Type 2af is a permitted alternative to Type 3f. 
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PART4: REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRECELLS  Acceptible Solution C/AS1    
 
Table 4.1/3:  Fire safety precautions for active 
purpose group firecells 
Occupant load 
501 to 1000 
Escape height 
Purpose Group 0m 
(or single 
floor) 




<10 m (or  
3 floors) 
10 m 
to <25 m 
25 m  
to <34 m 
34 m  
to <46 m 
46 m 
to <58 m 
Over  
58 m 
F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 
16 16 9 9 9 9 9 9 
18c 18c 16 16 13 13 13 13 
  18c 18 15 15 15 15 
    16 16 16 16 
    18 18 18 17 
       18 
       19 
CL 
(Notes 6) 
       20 
F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 
16 16 9 9 9 9 9 9 
18c 18c 16 15 13 13 13 13 
  18c 16 15 15 15 15 
   18 16 16 16 16 
    18 18 18 17 
     20 20 18 
       19 
CM 
(Note 5) 
       20 
















































































Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Notes: 
1. Use of Table: Refer to Paragraph 4.4 for instructions on using this table to determine the fire safety precautions in firecells. 
2. Adjoining firecells having a FO rating: Paragraph 6.2.1 requires adjoining firecells to be separated by fire separations with FRR no 
less than 15/1 5/1 5. 
3. Intermediate Floors: Where a firecell contains intermediate floors a 15/15/15 FRR shall apply to the intermediate floors and 
supporting elements, and smoke control systems Type 9 and either Type 10 or Type 11, are required (see Paragraphs 4.5.16 to 
4.5.18, 6.14.3 and 6.21.5 to 6.22.14). 
4. Car Parking: Refer to Paragraphs 6.10.3 to 6.10.6 for car parking provisions within buildings. 
5. Sprinklers: Refer to Paragraph 5.6.l2forsprinkler requirements in FHC4 firecells where the escape height is two floors or higher. 
6. CL cinemas and theatres: Type 16d is required for all escape heights. 
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Acceptible Solution C/AS1 PART4: REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRECELLS 
 
Table 4.1/4:  Fire safety precautions for active 




Purpose Group 0m 
(or single 
floor) 




<10 m (or  
3 floors) 
10 m 
to <25 m 
25 m  
to <34 m 
34 m  
to <46 m 
46 m 
to <58 m 
Over  
58 m 
F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
16d 16d 9 9 9 9 9 9 
18c 18c 16d 16d 13 13 13 13 
  18c 18 15 15 15 15 
    16d 16d 16d 16d 
    18 18 18 17 
       18 
       19 
CL 
 
       20 
F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
16d 16d 9 9 9 9 9 9 
18c 18c 16d 15 13 13 13 13 
  18c 16d 15 15 15 15 
   18 16d 16d 16d 16d 
    18 18 18 17 
     20 20 18 
       19 
CM 
(Note 5) 
       20 
















































































Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Notes: 
1. Use of Table: Refer to Paragraph 4.4 for instructions on using this table to determine the fire safety precautions in firecells. 
2. Adjoining firecells having a FO rating: Paragraph 6.2.1 requires adjoining firecells to be separated by fire separations with FRR no 
less than 15/1 5/1 5. 
3. Intermediate Floors: Where a firecell contains intermediate floors a 15/15/15 FRR shall apply to the intermediate floors and 
supporting elements, and smoke control systems Type 9 and either Type 10 or Type 11, are required (see Paragraphs 4.5.16 to 
4.5.18, 6.14.3 and 6.21.5 to 6.22.14). 
4. Car Parking: Refer to Paragraphs 6.10.3 to 6.10.6 for car parking provisions within buildings. 
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Table 4.1/5:  Fire safety precautions for active 




Purpose Group 0m 
(or single 
floor) 




<10 m (or  
3 floors) 
10 m 
to <25 m 
25 m  
to <34 m 
34 m  
to <46 m 
46 m 
to <58 m 
Over  
58 m 
F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
16d 16d 16d 9 8 8 8 8 
18c 18c 18c 15 9 9 9 9 
   16d 13 13 13 13 
   18 15 15 15 15 
    16d 16d 16d 16d 
    18 18 18 17 





       19 
        20 
F0 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F30 F60 
4aef 4aef 4e 4e 7e 7e 7e 7e 
16a 16a 14 14 8 8 8 8 
18c 18c 16a 15 9 9 9 9 
  18c 16 15 13 13 13 
   18 16 15 15 15 
    18 16 16 16 
     18 18 17 
     20 20 18 
SA 
(Note 5) 
       20 





























Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Notes: 
1. Use of Table: Refer to Paragraph 4.4 for instructions on using this table to determine the fire safety precautions in firecells. 
2. Adjoining firecells having a FO rating: Paragraph 6.2.1 requires adjoining firecells to be separated by fire separations with FRR no 
less than 15/1 5/1 5. 
3. Intermediate Floors: Where a firecell contains intermediate floors a 15/15/15 FRR shall apply to the intermediate floors and 
supporting elements, and smoke control systems Type 9 and either Type 10 or Type 11, are required (see Paragraphs 4.5.16 to 
4.5.18, 6.14.3 and 6.21.5 to 6.22.14). 
4. Car Parking: Refer to Paragraphs 6.10.3 to 6.10.6 for car parking provisions within buildings. 
5. Sprinklered firecells: Purpose group SA may have an occupant load up to 160 beds in firecells with a type 7 alarm (see Paragraph 
6.7.2)  
6.  Occupant load in SC and SD firecells: The occupant load in a group sleeping area firecell is limited to 12 to 20 beds and in a suite 
to 6 beds (See Paragraphs 6.6.3 to 6.6.5). For firecells (such as an operating theatre) required to remain occupied during a fire, see 
Paragraphs 5.6.8 and 5.6.9. 
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Appendix E : Case Study Building BRANZFIRE input. 
 
Gross Floor Area       934 sq.m 
Storey height       3.42 m 
Effective ceiling height     3.27 m  
 
Main Compartment   
Net equiv. area  29.4 x 29.4 =    864 sq.m  
External wall, glazed area  120  x 2.0  =    240 sq.m 
                       leakage 3.2 x.120 x 2 x 0.00021 *=   0.080 = 2 x .04sq.m  
Floor, fire dampers 2% (assumed) openings 
   4.2 sq.m x 0.02 =    0.084  
           leakage  864 sq.m x 0.000052 *=   0.045 
        0.13 sq.m  
Stairs  
Plan dimension 9.8 m x 1.15.m 
Wall, leakage  2(9.8 + 1.15) x 3.42 x 0.00011* =  0.0082 
          Door       0.0157* 
        0.0239 = 2 x 0.012 sq.m 
(See below for effective wall leakage to outside) 
Open door       2 x 1 sq.m 
Roof,   0.25 sq.m opening with fire dampers  (say) 2%= 0.01 sq.m 
Floor, open shaft below (say)     0.05 sq.m 
 
Lifts. 
Total effective plan dimension 12.6 m x 2.3 m  
Wall, leakage  2(12.6 + 2.3) x 3.42 x 0.00084 =  0.086 
         Doors ( 5 off) 5 x 0.0157* =     0.079 
        0.165 = 2 x 0.083 sq.m 
(See below for effective wall leakage to outside) 
Roof,  0.6 sq.m to machine room, (say) 50% eff.=   0.30 sq,m 
Floor, open shaft (say)     0.33 sq.m 
 
Shaft leakage to outside 
Between modelled floors, leakage from lifts and stairs is modelled to the outside. 
However the actual amount of leakage will be controlled by the leakage areas from the 
intermediate floors to the outside. Typically, this area is 0.080 sq.m as above. As each 
stair has only 0.024 sq.m leakage area compared with 0.165 for the lifts, leakage from 
the stair is assumed to be negligible, and leakage from the lift taken as  a full height slot 
of (3.42 x) 0.02m. 
 
Wall damage to shafts. 
For the moderate damage it is assumed that cracking occurs at the joints in the lining 
materials, resulting in openings of a nominal 2 mm width.  
For each stair, there are some 75 linear metre of joint, plus a door. This gives a total of  
0.16 sq.m , of which 0.12 sq.m is into the main floor area. This is equivalent to a 
continuous slot of (3.42 x) 0.04 m. at each floor. 
Similarly for the lifts, 102 linear metres of joint gives an effective slot of (3.42 x ) 
0.06m.at each floor. 




For major damage, it is assumed that the lining materials show significant separation 
from the framing. Leakage areas assumed are 0.3 m wide equivalent slots to the stairs, 
and 0.6 m to the lift shaft. This damage is initiated by inter-storey deflections, which 
will reduce towards the top of the building. Leakage to intermediate floors is therefore 
taken as for the moderate damage case above, which is more conservative for tenability 
in the modelled rooms and shafts. 
 
It is likely that a significant amount of external glazing is broken in the earthquake. The 
proportion of glazing broken is taken as 2/3 of the total for 2 parallel walls, giving 40 
metres length. 
 
* Reference for typical leakage areas is Klote and Milke (1992). 
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Monday,January 13,2003,05:31 PM 
Input Filename : C:\Program Files\BRANZFIRE2002—5\data\CS1.mod 
 
BRANZFIRE Multi-Compartment Fire Model (Ver 2002.7) 
 
Copyright Notice —  This software is provided for evaluation only and may not be used for 
commercial purposes. 
 
Case Study, Fire Level 3 - No sprinklers, Door to stair 1 open, walls damaged. 
 
========================================================================== 
Description of Rooms 
========================================================================== 
 
Room 1 : level 3 fire floor 
 Room Length (m) =  29.40 
 Room Width (m) =  29.40 
 Maximum Room Height (m) = 3.27 
 Minimum Room Height (m) = 3.27 
 Floor Elevation (m) = 7.020 
 Room 1 has a flat ceiling. 
 
 Wall Surface is glass (plate) 
 Wall Density (kg/m3) = 2700.0 
 Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) = 0.760 
 Wall Emissivity = 0.90 
 Wall Thickness (mm) = 5.0 
 
 Ceiling Surface is concrete 
 Ceiling Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Ceiling Emissivity = 0.50 
 Ceiling Thickness (mm) = 150.0 
 
 Floor Surface is Carpet 4 flooring material 
 Floor Density (kg/m3) = 204.0 
 Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) = 0.170 
 Floor Emissivity = 0.90 
 Floor Thickness = (mm) 20.0 
  
 Floor Substrate is concrete 
 Floor Substrate Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Floor Substrate Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Floor Substrate Thickness (mm) = 150.0 
 
Room 2 : stair no 1 
 Room is modelled as a single zone. 
 Room Length (m) =  9.80 
 Room Width (m) =  1.15 
 Maximum Room Height (m) = 64.98 
 Minimum Room Height (m) = 64.98 
 Floor Elevation (m) = 7.020 
 Room 2 has a flat ceiling. 
 
 Wall Surface is plasterboard, gypsum paper-faced 
 Wall Density (kg/m3) = 760.0 
 Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) = 0.160 
 Wall Einissivity = 0.88 
 Wall Thickness (iran) = 16.0 
  
 Ceiling Surface is concrete 
 Ceiling Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Ceiling Emissivity = 0.50 
 Ceiling Thickness (mm) = 150.0 
 
 Floor Surface is concrete 
 Floor Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Floor Emissivity = 0.50 
 Floor Thickness = (mm) 100.0 
 
Room 3 : stair no 2 
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 Room is modelled as a single zone. 
 Room Length (m) =  9.80 
 Room Width (m) =  1.15 
 Maximum Room Height (m) = 64.98 
 Minimum Room Height (m) = 64.98 
 Floor Elevation (m) = 7.020 
 Room 3 has a flat ceiling. 
 
 Wall Surface is plasterboard, gypsum paper—faced 
 Wall Density (kg/m3) = 760.0 
 Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) = 0.160 
 Wall Emissivity = 0.88 
 Wall Thickness (mm) = 16.0 
 
 Ceiling Surface is concrete 
 Ceiling Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Ceiling Emissivity = 0.50 
 Ceiling Thickness (mm) = 150.0 
 
 Floor Surface is concrete 
 Floor Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Floor Emissivity = 0.50 
 Floor Thickness = (mm) 100.0 
 
Room 4 : lift shaft 
  Room is modelled as a single zone. 
  Room Length (m) =  12.60 
  Room Width (m) =  2.30 
  Maximum Room Height (m) = 64.98 
  Minimum Room Height (m) = 64.98 
  Floor Elevation (m) = 7.020 
  Room 4 has a flat ceiling. 
 
  Wall Surface is plasterboard, gypsum paper-faced 
 Wall Density (kg/m3) = 760.0 
 Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) = 0.160 
 Wall Emissivity = 0.88 
 Wall Thickness (mm) = 16.0 
 
 Ceiling Surface is concrete 
 Ceiling Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Ceiling Emissivity = 0.50 
 Ceiling Thickness (mm) = 150.0 
 
 Floor Surface is concrete 
 Floor Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Floor Emissivity = 0.50 
 Floor Thickness = (mm) 100.0 
 
Room 5 : level 4 
  Room Length (m) =  29.40 
  Room Width (m) =  29.40 
  Maximum Room Height (m) = 3.27 
  Minimum Room Height (m) = 3.27 
  Floor Elevation (m) = 10.440 
  Room 5 has a flat ceiling. 
 
  Wall Surface is glass (plate) 
 Wall Density (kg/m3) = 2700.0 
 Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) = 0.760 
 Wall Emissivity = 0.90 
 Wall Thickness (mm) = 5.0 
  
 Ceiling Surface is concrete 
 Ceiling Density (kg/m3) = 2300.0 
 Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) = 1.200 
 Ceiling Emissivity = 0.50 
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 Floor Density (kg/m3) = 204.0 
 Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) =  0.170 
 Floor Emissivity =  0.90 
 Floor Thickness = (mm)  20.0  
 
 Floor Substrate is concrete 
 Floor Substrate Density (kg/m3) =  2300.0 
 Floor Substrate Conductivity (W/m.K) =  1.200 
 Floor Substrate Thickness (mm) =  150.0 
 
Room 6 : level 20 
 Room Length (m) =  29.40 
 Room Width (m) =  29.40 
 Maximum Room Height (m) = 3.27 
 Minimum Room Height (m) = 3.27 
 Floor Elevation (m) = 65.160 
 Room 6 has a flat ceiling. 
 
 Wall Surface is glass (plate) 
 Wall Density (kg/m3) =  2700.0 
 Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) =  0.760 
 Wall Emissivity =  0.50 
 Wall Thickness (mm) =  5.0 
 
 Ceiling Surface is concrete 
 Ceiling Density (kg/m3) =  2300.0 
 Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) =  1.200 
 Ceiling Emissivity = 0.50 
 Ceiling Thickness (mm) = 150.0 
 
 Floor Surface is Carpet 4 flooring material 
 Floor Density (kg/m3) =  760.0 
 Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) =  0.160 
 Floor Emissivity =  0.88 
 Floor Thickness = (mm)  20.0 
 
 Floor Substrate is concrete 
 Floor Substrate Density (kg/m3) =  2300.0 
 Floor Substrate Conductivity (W/rn.K) =  1.200 
 Floor Substrate Thickness (mm) =  150.0 
 
========================================================================== 
Description of Wall Vents 
========================================================================== 
From room 1 to 2 , Vent No 1 
      Vent Width (m) = 1.000 
      Vent Height (m) = 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
      Vent Soffit Height (m) = 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec) = 0 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to 2 , Vent No 2 
      Vent Width (m) = 0.040 
      Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
      Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
      Vent Soffit Height (m) = 3.270 
      Opening Time (sec) = 0 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to 3 , Vent No 1 
      Vent Width (m) = 0.040 
      Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
      Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
      Vent Soffit Height (m) = 3.270 
      Opening Time (sec) = 0 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to 4 , Vent No 1 
      Vent Width (m) = 0.060 
      Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
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   Vent Soffit Height(m)= 3.270 
   Opening Time (sec) = 0 
   Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to outside, Vent No 1 
      Vent Width(m)= 10.000 
      Vent Height(m)= 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height(m)= 0.000 
      Vent Sof fit Height(m)= 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec)= 700 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to outside, Vent No 2 
      Vent Width (m) = 10.000 
      Vent Height (m) = 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height (m)= 0.000 
      Vent Soffit Height (m) = 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec) = 800 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to outside, Vent No 3 
      Vent Width (m) = 10.000 
      Vent Height (m) = 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
      Vent Sof fit Height (m)= 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec) = 900 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to outside, Vent No 4 
      Vent Width (m)== 20.000 
      Vent Height (m) = 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
      Vent Soffit Height (m) = 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec) = 1000 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1 to outside, Vent No 5 
      Vent Width (m) = 20.000 
      Vent Height (m)= 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height (m)= 0.000 
      Vent Soffit Height (m)= 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec) = 1100 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 1  to outside, Vent No 6 
  Vent Width (m)=    20.000 
  Vent Height (m)=    2.000 
                  Vent Sill Height(m)=   0.000 
  Vent Soffit Height(m)=  2.000 
  Opening Time (sec)=    1200 
  Closing Time (sec)    0 
 
From room 1 to outside, Vent No 7 
      Vent Width (m)= 20.000 
      Vent Height (m)= 2.000 
      Vent Sill Height (m)= 0.000 
      Vent Sof fit Height(m)= 2.000 
      Opening Time (sec) = 1300 
      Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 2 to 5, Vent No 1 
   Vent Width (m) =  0.040 
   Vent Height (m)=  3.270 
   Vent Sill Height(m)=  3.420 
   Vent Soffit Height(m)= 6.690 
   Opening Time (sec) = 0 
   Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 2 to 6, Vent No 1 
   Vent Width (m)= 0.040 
   Vent Height (m)= 3.270 
   Vent Sill Height (m)= 58.140 
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 opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 3 to 5,  Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.040 
 Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
 Vent Sill Height (m) = 3.420 
 Vent Soffit Height (m) = 6.690 
 Opening Time (sec)= 0 
 Closing Time (sec)= 0 
 
From room 3 to 6,  Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.040 
 Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
 Vent Sill Height(m) = 58.140 
 Vent Soffit Height(m) = 61.410 
 Opening Time (sec)= 0 
 Closing Time (sec)= 0 
 
From room 4 to 5,  Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.060 
 Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
 Vent Sill Height (m) = 3.420 
 Vent Soffit Height(m) = 6.690 
 Opening Time (sec)= 0 
 Closing Time (sec)= 0 
 
From room 4 to 6,  Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.060 
 Vent Height (m) = 3.270 
 Vent Sill Height(m) = 58.140 
 Vent Soffit Height(m) = 61.410 
 Opening Time (sec)= 0 
 Closing Time (sec)= 0 
 
From room 4 to outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.020 
 Vent Height (m) = 51.300 
 Vent Sill Height (m) = 6.840 
 Vent Soffit Height (m) = 58.140 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 5 to outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.040 
 Vent Height (m) = 2.000 
 Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
 Vent Soffit Height (m) = 2.000 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
From room 6 to outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Width (m) = 0.040 
 Vent Height (m) = 2.000 
 Vent Sill Height (m) = 0.000 
 Vent Soffit Height (m) = 2.000 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 
================================================================================ 
Description of Ceiling/Floor Vents 
================================================================================ 
Upper room 1 to lower outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) =  0.13 
 Opening Time (sec) =  0 
 Closing Time (sec) =  0 
 Open method =  Manual 
 
Upper room 2 to lower outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) =  0.05 
 Opening Time (sec) =  0 
 Closing Time (sec) =  0 
 Open method =  Manual 
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Upper room 3 to lower outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.05 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper room 4 to lower outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.33 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper room 5 to lower room 1 , Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.13 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper room 6 to lower outside, Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.13 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper outside to lower room 2 , Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.01 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper outside to lower room 3 , Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.01 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper outside to lower room 4 , Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.30 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper outside to lower room 5 , Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.13 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 
 Open method = Manual 
 
Upper outside to lower room 6 , Vent No 1 
 Vent Area (m2) = 0.13 
 Opening Time (sec) = 0 
 Closing Time (sec) = 0 





Interior Temp (C) =  20.0 
Exterior Temp (C) = 20.0 





Monitoring Height for Visibility and FED (m) = 2.00 
Occupant Activity Level = Light 
Visibility calculations assume: reflective signs 
FED Start Time (sec) 0 
FED End Time (sec)  1800 
 
======================================================================== 
Sprinkler / Detector Parameters 
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========================================================================= 
No thermal detector or sprinkler installed. 
 
========================================================================= 
Mechanical Ventilation (to/from outside) 
========================================================================= 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 1 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 2 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 3 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 4 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 5 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 6 
 
========================================================================== 
Description of the Fire 
========================================================================== 
Radiant Loss Fraction = 0.35 
Underventilated Soot Yield Factor = 1.00 
Smoke Emission Coefficent (l/m) = 0.80 
Characteristic Mass Loss per Unit Area (kgls.m2) = 0.011 
Air Entrainment in Plume uses McCaffrey (recommended) 
 
Burning Object No 1 
work station composite 
 Located in Room 1 
 Energy Yield (kJ/g)= 12.4 
 C02 Yield (kg/kg fuel) = 1.270 
 Soot Yield (kg/kg fuel) = 0.015 
 H20 Yield (kg/kg fuel) = 0.442 
 Fire Height (m) = 0.500 
 Fire Location (m) Centre 
 
 Time (sec) Heat Release (kW) 
 0  0 
 40  30 
 80  122 
 120 274 
 160 486 
 200 760 
 240 1095 
 280 1490 
 320 1946 
 400 3040 
 480 4380 
 560 5960 
 680 8786 
 800 12160 
 920 16080 
 1040 20550 
 1200 27360 
 1400 37240 
 1600 48640 
 1800 61560 





Postflashover model is ON. 
 FLED (MJ/m2) = 800 
 Fuel Density (kg/m3) = 500 
 Average heat of Combustion (MJ/kg) = 16.0 
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Appendix F : Required Safe Egress Time : Calculation. 
 
Data 
Net floor area        800 m 
Design Occupant Density      0.1 person/sq.m 
Max. Open Path length to stair entry    30 m for 2 stairs available 
40 m for 2 stairs available 
Door width   1.0 m 
Stair Width   1.12 m 
Stair Geometry 
Tread / riser      275 / 180 mm 
Storey height      3.42 m 
Effective landing travel length   3.6 m 
Open Path Travel 
Travel speed  (Smax)      73 m/min. 
Max. travel time   tu   =   30 / 73  =         0.4 m for 2 stairs 
available 
 or, allowing some investigation time (say)  0.7 m for 1 stair 
Capacity of doors 
Effective width   We =   1.0 – 0.1  =  0.9 m 
Max. Specific Flow  Fs   =   1.3 x 60  =  78 person/min/m 
Max. Calculated Flow  Fc   =   0.9 x 78  =  70.2 person/min. 
Min. time to evacuate floor  (no queuing)  80 / 70.2 = 1.14 min. 
Capacity of Stair. 
Effective Width   We  =   1.12 – 2 x 0.165 = 0.79 m 
Specific Flow    (for 275 x 180 tread)  60.6 person/min/m 
Calculated Flow  Fc   =   60.6 x 0.79  =  47.9 person/min. 
Resultant flow at exit door  Fcd  =   47.9 / 0.9    =   53.2  <  70.2 
Stair capacity controls  
Stair Flow Density    D =  Dmax  =    1.86 person/min 
Speed on stair   S   =  64 (1 - .266 x 1.86)  =   32.3 m/min 
Effective length of stair Ls   =   1.85 x 3.42 + 3.6  = 9.93 m / flight 
Travel time on stair  ts   =  9.93 / 32.3  =  0.31 min/ flight. 
Evacuation Time 
Assume all floors start to enter stair/s at the same time. 
Stair/s will be full after      =  0.31 mins 
Number of persons in stair   =  0.31  x  47.9  =  15 persons/floor/stair 
Time to evacuate 1 floor =   80 / 47.9  =   1.67 mins for 1 stair 
  ( no queuing)    x 0.5 =   0.84 mins for 2 stairs 
 
Assume 3 minute pre-movement time 
Assume 0.5 minute travel from base of stair/s to final exit 
Time to evacuate building =  (19 x 1.67) + 3.7 +0 .5 = 35.9 mins for 1 stair 
    =  (19 x 0.84) + 3.4 + 0.5 = 19.9 mins for 2 stairs. 
 
 




Appendix G : scenario evacuation model.  
 
Refer Spreadsheet printout on following pages. 
The tenability times for a fire on each floor and each damage scenario are assessed 
from the BRANZFIRE printout. These are then combined on the spreadsheets below 
to determine an average number of occupants at risk for each scenario. 
 
The nomenclature and calculations used for the spreadsheet is as follows. 
 
T1 = tenability time for stair No. 1.  (This is the stair with open door where 
appropriate) 
 
T2 = tenability time for stair No. 2 
. 
T3 = number of persons who can evacuate past any point on the stair in time T1, 
assuming 2 stairs are available 
     =  (T1 – 3.4) x 95.8 
 
T4 = number of persons who can evacuate past any floor in time T2, assuming 2 stairs 
are available only until the smoke layer in the fire floor reaches door head height 
     = ((T2 – 3.7) + (5.5 – 3.4)) x 47.9,  where (5.5 – 3.4) x 47.9 is number of persons 
that can pass the fire floor  in 1 stair before the smoke layer lowers. 
 
P =  number of persons at risk for each scenario for a fire of any floor 
   =  number of persons on and above the fire floor before the fire less the number who 
       can evacuate past the fire floor before the stairs become untenable 
   =  (21 – N) x 80  – T3    (or - T4 as appropriate.), where N = number of fire floor.  
  
SUM(P) = the sum of the positive values of P for each scenario 
 
AVG  =  SUM(P) / 19  =  average for SUM(P) over all floors for each scenario.  
 
 
Occupants at risk : calculation 
 
Refer Spreadsheet in Appendix H. 
 
For the selected earthquake events, the product of the individual feature probabilities 
of each scenario (from Table 9.2) is obtained to give an overall probability for the 
scenario for that earthquake. The overall probability for the scenario (is then 
multiplied by the average number of occupants at risk (AVG as above), and the results 
summed to give the total for the particular earthquake event. to obtain total number at 








Tenability    
Scenario 
Number          
time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
T1 10.9 14.0  8.4 8.4 7.3 10.9 14.0 14.4 8.4 8.4 7.3 
T2 11.0 33.6  8.4 10.0 22.2 11.0 33.6 40.0 8.4 10 22.2 
T3 718.5 1015.5  479.0 479.0 373.6 718.5 1015.5 1053.8 479.0 479.0 373.6 
T4 449.7 1532.2   401.8 986.2 449.7 1532.2 1838.8  401.8 986.2 
             
Floor N             P  =  Number of persons at risk        
20 -638.5 -1452  -399 -399 -906 -638 -1452 -1759 -399 -399 -906 
19 -558.5 -1372  -319 -319 -826 -558 -1372 -1679 -319 -319 -826 
18 -478.5 -1292  -239 -239 -746 -478 -1292 -1599 -239 -239 -746 
17 -398.5 -1212  -159 -159 -666 -398 -1212 -1519 -159 -159 -666 
16 -318.5 -1132  -79 -79 -586 -318 -1132 -1439 -79 -79 -586 
15 -238.5 -1052  1 1 -506 -238 -1052 -1359 1 1 -506 
14 -158.5 -972  81 81 -426 -158 -972 -1279 81 81 -426 
13 -78.5 -892  161 161 -346 -78 -892 -1199 161 161 -346 
12 2 -812  241 241 -266 2 -812 -1119 241 241 -266 
11 82 -732  321 321 -186 82 -732 -1039 321 321 -186 
10 162 -652  401 401 -106 162 -652 -959 401 401 -106 
9 242 -572  481 481 -26 242 -572 -879 481 481 -26 
8 322 -492  561 561 54 322 -492 -799 561 561 54 
7 402 -412  641 641 134 402 -412 -719 641 641 134 
6 482 -332  721 721 214 482 -332 -639 721 721 214 
5 562 -252  801 801 294 562 -252 -559 801 801 294 
4 642 -172  881 881 374 642 -172 -479 881 881 374 
3 722 -92  961 961 454 722 -92 -399 961 961 454 
2 802 -12  1041 1041 534 802 -12 -319 1041 1041 534 
             
SUM(P) 4417 0 0 7294 7294 2058 4420 0 0 7294 7294 2058 
AVG 232 0 0 384 384 108 233 0 0 384 384 108 
             





Scenario Number           
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
11.0 33.6  8.5 10.0 24.3 11.0 33.6 40 8.5 10.0 24.3 
11.0 33.6  8.5 10.0 24.3 11.0 33.6 40.0 8.5 10.0 24.3 
728.1 2893.2  488.6 632.3 2002.2 728.1 2893.2 3506.3 488.6 632.3 2002.2 
            
            
P  =  Number of persons at risk          
-648 -2813.2  -409 -552 -1922 -648 -2813 -3426 -409 -552 -1922 
-568 -2733.2  -329 -472 -1842 -568 -2733 -3346 -329 -472 -1842 
-488 -2653.2  -249 -392 -1762 -488 -2653 -3266 -249 -392 -1762 
-408 -2573.2  -169 -312 -1682 -408 -2573 -3186 -169 -312 -1682 
-328 -2493.2  -89 -232 -1602 -328 -2493 -3106 -89 -232 -1602 
-248 -2413.2  -9 -152 -1522 -248 -2413 -3026 -9 -152 -1522 
-168 -2333.2  71 -72 -1442 -168 -2333 -2946 71 -72 -1442 
-88 -2253.2  151 8 -1362 -88 -2253 -2866 151 8 -1362 
-8 -2173.2  231 88 -1282 -8 -2173 -2786 231 88 -1282 
72 -2093.2  311 168 -1202 72 -2093 -2706 311 168 -1202 
152 -2013.2  391 248 -1122 152 -2013 -2626 391 248 -1122 
232 -1933.2  471 328 -1042 232 -1933 -2546 471 328 -1042 
312 -1853.2  551 408 -962 312 -1853 -2466 551 408 -962 
392 -1773.2  631 488 -882 392 -1773 -2386 631 488 -882 
472 -1693.2  711 568 -802 472 -1693 -2306 711 568 -802 
552 -1613.2  791 648 -722 552 -1613 -2226 791 648 -722 
632 -1533.2  871 728 -642 632 -1533 -2146 871 728 -642 
712 -1453.2  951 808 -562 712 -1453 -2066 951 808 -562 
792 -1373.2  1031 888 -482 792 -1373 -1986 1031 888 -482 
            
4320 0 0 7163 5304 0 4320 0 0 7163 5304 0 
227 0 0 377 279 0 227 0 0 377 279 0 
            






Appendix H : Case study building :  
occupants at risk  (typical printout).  
       
Case 2: Moderate Earthquake     
       
       
Scenario           Feature Probability   No. at 
 Door Press. Sprinkler Barrier  Risk 
       
1 0.05 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0002 0.03 
2 0.95 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.0011 0.00 
3  0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0003 0.00 
4  0.7 0.9 0.1 0.0014 0.52 
5   0.1 0.7 0.0095 3.63 
6   0.9 0.2 0.0027 0.29 
7   0.1 0.1 0.0004 0.08 
8   0.9 0.7 0.0025 0.00 
9    0.2 0.0007 0.00 
10    0.1 0.0032 1.21 
11    0.7 0.0221 8.47 
12    0.2 0.0063 0.68 
13    0.1 0.0029 0.65 
14   . 0.7 0.0200 0.00 
15    0.2 0.0057 0.00 
16    0.1 0.0257 9.67 
17    0.7 0.1796 50.09 
18    0.2 0.0513 0.00 
19    0.1 0.0067 1.51 
20    0.7 0.0466 0.00 
21    0.2 0.0133 0.00 
22    0.1 0.0599 22.56 
23    0.7 0.4190 116.89 
24    0.2 0.1197 0.00 
       
SUM 1 2 4 8 1 216.28 
       
       
Refer to Appendix G for basis of calculation.   
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